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ABSTRACT

Phenomenological Intentionality of Pedro Salinas in His Travels and in His Poem
“La memoria en las manos” from Largo Lamento

Andrew Willard Bishop
Department of Spanish and Portuguese
Master of Arts

Intentionality, in its various forms, connects the subject with objects as they appear
within the subject’s view of the world. Poets, like artists, create with their bodies and perceive
the world with their senses and with their souls. Subjects allow objects to reveal themselves, to
manifest themselves having identities according to the contexts in which they appear. This
system is called intentionality—a phenomenological concept in which appearances have
ontological meanings. Phenomenology, as explained by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, provides a
theoretical framework within which Pedro Salinas’s poetry may be understood and interpreted.
Pedro Salinas forms part of Spain’s Generation of 1927 and produces collections of
poetry about the intentionality of the beloved during a love affair. La voz a ti debida, Razón de
Amor, and Largo Lamento form a type of trilogy under the suggestion of his friend Jorge Guillén.
Salinas resides in America during and after the Spanish Civil War and composes poems which
later appear in Largo Lamento posthumously. “La memoria en las manos” exemplifies how the
subject intends the stone and his hands while remembering an experience with the beloved. The
poetic self in the poem probes the identities of objects in order to comprehend the essence of the
beloved and of himself.
Pedro Salinas practices intense observations in real life when he travels. While teaching
in various schools across the country, he attends conferences showcasing his literary criticism,
poetry, and playwriting. He corresponds prolifically with his wife Margarita Bonmatí. Through
his correspondence with his wife, we see how despite distances and space, he thinks of her
constantly. He relates a theory of tourism that coincides with Merleau-Ponty’s “brute
expression.” On one occasion, he travels to Los Angeles, California to attend a literary
conference. Along the way he travels through Missouri, Colorado, and Utah visiting various
landscapes, national parks, and cities. He chronicles his impressions in letters to his wife. The
letters Salinas writes and the appearances he contemplates show his focus and soul are not only
his wife, but also Katherine Whitmore, his lover. Margarita and Katherine form a conflation that
Salinas perceives in his surroundings.
Keywords: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pedro Salinas, phenomenology, intentionality, Utah
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Phenomenology
Experiences come about in different ways, and each person values one form of perception
over another. There are individual experiences, collective experiences, and even absurd
experiences. Experiences highlight how a person learns or does not learn. Decisions we make
alter, confirm, or destroy beliefs we have about the world. Philosophers have debated about
these experiences over centuries. By the nineteenth century, philosophers, specifically Edmund
Husserl and Martin Heidegger, start discussing about how a person perceives. Their
predecessors, including René Descartes, have dismissed subjective experience, or the first-person
point of view, as problematic or separate from objective reality. Edmund Husserl—along with
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and José Ortega y Gasset—disagrees and works to
understand the experience one has while living. Experience must be more than what his
predecessors expected, and philosophers after Husserl work to highlight an area dismissed by
philosophy. Their work encompasses a field of philosophy called phenomenology.
Phenomenology entails a deeper understanding of appearances. The understanding of
appearances requires us to analyze objects in an unaccustomed way. There are several terms we
need to understand that are related to phenomenology. These terms will appear in this and
subsequent chapters. The terms and phrases we seek to understand are the following: (1)
intentionality, (2) perception, (3) presence, (4) absence, (5) empty intention, (6) filled intention,
(7) intuition, (8) eidetic intuition, (9) memory, (10) evidence, and (11) identity in a manifold.
Robert Sokolowski summarizes the aim of phenomenology as “the study of human
experience and of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience” and
“confronts the issues raised by modern thought” (Sokolowski 2). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition) defines phenomenology as “Literally [. . .] the study of
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‘phenomena’ [or the] conscious experience as experienced from the subjective or first person
point of view” (Smith Section 1). Phenomena include everyday objects we consciously and
unconsciously see, hear, touch, taste, and smell. Our thoughts also are phenomena and we can
think of objects whether they are real or imaginary. Unlike empiricism, phenomenology does
not take objects for granted and allows subjectivity to have a say. It attempts to unfold an
object’s meaning, essence, and reason for “being” in the world. Each object presents us an
existence that we can identify, investigate, and discover. Objects, whether real or imaginary,
exist and we occupy a privileged place as beholders. Real objects come from what we perceive
and imaginary objects inhabit our inner worlds of thought. Imaginary objects can remain in our
thoughts or they can express themselves in works of art for the rest of the world to see. The way
we see objects and represent them in various forms constitutes them as phenomena.
Phenomenology offers thinkers the ability to ponder appearances within the here and now, as
well as the capability to analyze them in other contexts.
Philosophers since Plato have reflected upon human experience. Experience expresses
itself in philosophy and later philosophy specializes into distinct fields. For instance, the
philosophy named “ethics” studies what is right or wrong. Ontology examines existence and
epistemology studies how someone gains knowledge of things and how one understands it.
Logic elucidates principles of valid reasoning and tries to demonstrate it in real life. There are
other fields that are not included in this list but are nevertheless important. Phenomenology “is
to be distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy” Smith tells us
(Section 1). However, phenomenologists seek for deeper meaning. They search for more
beyond the beliefs of appearances each field investigates. Each field has a phenomenological
branch, but phenomenology specializes in probing the significance of objects as the main inquiry.
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Smith states, “Phenomenology is commonly understood in either of two ways: as a disciplinary
field in philosophy, or as a movement in the history of philosophy” (Section 1).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born on March 14, 1908, in Rochefort, France. He studies
philosophy and teaches at a number of schools. He serves as an officer during the Second World
War and later joins Jean-Paul Sartre in editing the journal Les Temps Modernes from 1945 to
1952 (“Maurice”). Throughout his years he publishes works clarifying phenomenology and how
it can develop as a philosophy during the twentieth century.
Merleau-Ponty, who completes his certification in 1930 at the École Normale Supérieure,
focuses on the study of phenomenology in his works entitled The Structure of Behavior and
Phenomenology of Perception (Flynn Section 1). Later, he sums up that phenomenology’s goal
“is to understand the relationship of consciousness and nature: organic, psychological or even
social” (qtd. in Flynn).
The French philosopher makes an important contribution to phenomenology by not only
relying upon and revising certain points of previous phenomenologists, but he also integrates
behavioral and psychological findings into the philosophy. He still sides with Husserl and
Heidegger that sciences need to admit their inability to explain the world completely. However,
Merleau-Ponty sees value in some scientific findings and he takes those findings to help explain
phenomenological perception. He knows some appearances, like hallucinations, do not reveal or
conceal a true meaning on an object, but he investigates the subject’s instant perception of it as a
significant act of intentionality. Empiricists disregard absurd impressions. Merleau-Ponty wants
to know the process of arriving at an absurd impression. For example, if I see a purple dog in the
room, Merleau-Ponty wants to know how I come upon seeing a purple dog more than how I try
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to know if it is real or not. What is important is how I unconsciously say, “I see a purple dog,”
than consciously say, “Oh, that’s a plush, stuffed purple dog.”
Merleau-Ponty talks about the painter’s limitation to transform the object into art. The
philosopher, the artist, the writer, and other creators have to deal with limitations that resist the
full disclosure of an essence. Merleau-Ponty elaborates on Cézanne’s dilemma in his act of
painting. Cézanne struggles with feelings of self-worth as a painter and hesitates to consider the
opinions of patrons and critics, yet he attempts to create his works of art by relying on “the
immediate impression of nature” and “abandoning himself to the chaos of sensation” in order to
give works of art to his patrons and critics (“Cézanne’s Doubt” 63). This wish to connect with
society by eschewing contact with it and its alternatives of expression becomes a paradox.
Merleau-Ponty expounds:
He thought himself powerless because he was not omnipotent, because he was not
God and wanted nevertheless to portray the world, to change it completely into a
spectacle, to make visible how the world touches us. […] It is not enough for a
painter like Cézanne, an artist, or a philosopher, to create and express an idea;
they must also awaken the experiences which will make their idea take root in the
consciousness of others. If a work is successful, it has the strange power of being
self-teaching. The reader or spectator, by following the clues of a book or
painting, by establishing the concurring points of internal evidence and being
brought up short when straying too far to the left or right, guided by the con-fused
clarity of style, will in the end find what was intended to be communicated. The
painter can do no more than construct an image; he must wait for this image to
come to life for other people. When it does, the work of art will have united these
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separate lives; it will no longer exist in only one of them like a stubborn dream or
a persistent delirium, nor will it exist only in space as a colored piece of canvas.
It will dwell undivided in several minds, with a claim on every possible mind like
a perennial acquisition. (69-70, italics in original)
Merleau-Ponty, fascinated by the behavior of how artists perceive the world, studies the
connection between the artists and their works of art. He integrates phenomenology in a way his
forerunners have not considered.
We visit empiricism again in order to understand the differences between Descartes and
Merleau-Ponty. Since the time of the Scientific Revolution during the Renaissance, objectivism
has taken the lead in philosophical affairs. To obtain knowledge of the truth, one must observe
measurable data in objects. Descartes sustains this premise by teaching that the object that is
outside the mind and the image of it inside the mind are two different entities. The entity outside
the mind has temporary existence, but the appearance of the entity in the mind is the kind
humans think as real. A dualistic understanding necessitates objectivity. Disinterested searchers
of truth become authorities of truth. So, a chair I see and the chair itself are two distinct objects.
The chair exists within itself and for itself. The representation of the chair I have in my mind,
however, is the illusion. It does not have substance. It cannot have existence in itself or for itself.
But phenomenological philosophers like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty disagree. They think a
person who sees the chair, and the chair itself, have an existential relationship. This nondualistic concept suggests there is not a definite separation between person and the chair; or in
other words, between the subject and object. The phenomenological perception of a chair goes
two ways for the subject and the object. Not only can the subject observe the chair, but also the
subject can sense the chair observing the subject. This existential forging creates a reality of the
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appearance the subject perceives. Each arrives to ontological significance. Merleau-Ponty
asserts phenomenological reasoning as the better philosophy because appearance is not just an
appearance. I can go away from the chair until it is absent and later retrieve a memory of the
same chair some time later. Merleau-Ponty argues the memory of the chair is not just an
appearance, but an actual presence which recalls an object which is absent. The dualistic
reasoning of Descartes neglects the significance of an object’s absence, only mentioning the
object ceases to exist because I do not have the experience of sensing that object within my
perception. If I instead ignore dualistic thinking, and recognize that I have the potential to reach
an object in any manner of perception, then I can contemplate the object’s existence in infinite
points of view. Descartes believes the pineal gland does not act like another set of eyes seeing a
representation of an object (Descartes 167). Merleau-Ponty asks, “Shall we say, then, that there
is an inner gaze, that there is a third eye which sees the paintings and even the mental images
[…]?” (“Eye and Mind” 126). He answers this in the affirmative saying that the third eye, or the
gaze, sees “according to, or with” the object (126). Therefore, when I look at a painting or at
myself in a mirror, what I see is not an illusion per se, but a place in which my gaze can move
about and reach it like Alice passing through a looking-glass. “I would be hard pressed to say
where the painting is I am looking at,” says Merleau-Ponty, “[…] My gaze wanders within it as
in the halo of Being” (126, italics in original).
The fusion of the subject and object becomes a non-dualistic pairing in this act of seeing.
The subject gains significance because of the object and vice versa. In a phenomenological
system, there has to be a reaching outside of ourselves or an extending of ourselves if we want to
know ourselves. It seems counterintuitive that the subject comes to know itself by contemplating
its object and not itself. However, the person can gain insight by allowing his gaze to float
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among the images he looks at. In other words, the subject cannot and should not be distinct from
the object. They integrate into an existential being. Whereas Descartes establishes the concept
of dualism (or the distinction between self and world), Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy defends the
concept of non-dualism (or the amalgamation of self and world).
The process of intending an object through visual perception emerges from visual
mediums like paintings, particularly works by Cézanne. The artist reenacts the
phenomenological experience by painting. The use of the artist’s body connects with the sensual
perception of the surrounding objects with appropriate foregrounds and backgrounds. When an
artist paints a landscape, he paints what he sees with his body and not necessarily with his mind.
The artist retains the ability to see the world the way he sees it and the artist’s paintings give
patrons a privileged point of view. Merleau-Ponty expounds upon this concept in the following:
“The painter ‘takes his body with him’, says Valéry. Indeed we cannot imagine how a mind
could paint. It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings”
(“Eye and Mind” 123, italics in original). Visual perception, among other senses, is the medium
by which the artist perceives the world. All becomes the same entity. Upon perceiving the
world, the artist is perceived as well, and perceives himself according to this perception. These
perceptions can come layer by layer and can have multiple layers of significance. Not only do
eyes see, but the imagination penetrates deeper into the object’s multiple layers of essence
through a potentially infinite power. Merleau-Ponty places these tactile actions in planes called
“maps” as explained in the following quote:
All my changes of place figure on principle in a corner of my landscape; they are
carried over onto the map of the visible. Everything I see is on principle within
my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the ‘I
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can’. Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my
motor projects are both total parts of the same Being. (124)
The visible world is within reach for anyone who chooses to exercise this power. The visible
world presents itself to people and they can navigate physically through it. The artist, poet or
writer sees the visible world and transform it into a spectacle for the patron. The invisible world
is what and how they see the visible world, and they make the invisible world into a visible
spectacle. The patron then sees the spectacle and experiences the essence of the world.
The essence, belonging to the visible and the invisible worlds, is the same. Descartes
earlier describes the intermediary system of a stick to help the blind man see and makes it
analogous to how the eyes and the “fibres” perform their functions (Descartes 107, 153-54). The
pineal gland houses the “seat of the soul” and the mind does the seeing, the touching, and every
other form of perception (340). Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, insists the body performs
those functions, not the mind. If we return to the painter and his painting, we understand the
artist reduces the landscape in such a way that we can contemplate it, just like we can
contemplate our reflections in a mirror. Through this existential mirror, we see the relation we
have with the painting and the landscape, and come to an understanding of ourselves. We see
ourselves in the painting and we see the painting within ourselves. Upon contemplating our
visual perception of the work of art, we accept its qualities and essences. Merleau-Ponty states
that: “Quality, light, color, depth, which are there before us, are there only because they awaken
an echo in our bodies and because the body welcomes them” (“Eye and Mind” 125). There is
significance in how we and our bodies perceive. We are not stuck in a mind that interprets
sensations for us. We can understand ourselves by seeing what is outside ourselves. “The act by
which I lend myself to the spectacle,” adds Merleau-Ponty, “must be recognized as irreducible to
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anything else. I join it in a kind of blind recognition which precedes the intellectual working out
and clarification of the meaning” (Phenomenology 216).
Paradoxically, one can come to know oneself outside of oneself. One would suppose that
we must look inside ourselves and observe our own ambitions to reach the truth. However, a
person’s experience helps him or her realize the significance of this powerful use of perception.
Indeed, we know ourselves better when we interact with the world outside us. Merleau-Ponty
ponders this in the following citation: “This enigma derives from the fact that my body
simultaneously sees and is seen. That which looks at all things can also look at itself and
recognize, in what it sees, the ‘other side’ of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it touches
itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself” (“Eye and Mind” 124). Our act of perception
is flexible enough to turn back on ourselves. We can imagine what we look like, feel like in the
act of perception at any moment we choose.
Having the ability to see ourselves helps us to act in a way we want to act, to see in a way
we want to see, to perceive how objects perceive us. The object especially teaches us how we
become conscious of this perception and how that consciousness helps us to be seen as objects.
In “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty teaches how Cézanne reaches this chiasmus of perception
in the act of painting: “The picture took on fullness and density; it grew in structure and balance;
it came to maturity all at once. ‘The landscape thinks itself in me,’ he would say, ‘and I am its
consciousness’” (67). The landscape constructs a sphere of perception that allows our senses to
turn back on themselves. The exercise transforms our appearance, our actions into an object and
we can analyze possible outcomes and impressions. We understand ourselves because we
understand our visible world through our body, with our body, as our body within an invisible
sphere that allows us to do so. We are our body, and our body belongs to the world, and we
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cannot step outside it. We know who we are outside ourselves because we can turn our gaze
back to us.
One of the processes to know oneself outside oneself is through the sense of touch.
Merleau-Ponty considers the sense of touch to be the more basic sense of perception than the
sense of sight. The sense of touch may be more limited than the sense of sight, but subjects can
still reach outside themselves and know a world beyond their internal selves. A blind subject’s
penetration seems to weaken significantly against the surrounding darkness of the unknown, but
the sense of touch intervenes and guides the subject. Despite this limitation, perception can
occur and even surpass the sense of sight in some cases. In the case of lovers, the sense of touch
has a world of meaning whereas the sense of sight may take things for granted.
In discussing the sense of touch and its role in phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty focuses
on the hands as the primary means of expressing one’s will, one’s interaction with the world, and
one’s understanding of the world. The hands make sense because through them a subject can
touch, grasp, work, withhold, push away, and caress. The intentionality a person has through
touch takes in other layers and identities in manifolds that do not present themselves to other
senses. The hands have a way of convincing the subject of the object’s presence better than the
instant visual contact the eyes sense from a distance. Phenomenology believes a subject can
intend itself intending, or perceive itself perceiving. This doctrine holds true for Merleau-Ponty.
He demonstrates the potential of hands to sense this sensing with a mind experiment. MerleauPonty explains that:
If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to
apprehend with my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this
reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries at the last moment: the
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moment I feel my left hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease touching
my right hand with my left hand. But this last-minute failure does not drain all
truth from that presentiment I had of being able to touch myself touching: my
body does not perceive, but it is as if it were built around the perception that
dawns through it; through its whole internal arrangement, its sensory-motor
circuits, the return ways that control and release movements, it is, as it were,
prepared for a self-perception, even though it is never itself that is perceived nor
itself that perceives. (The Visible 322-23)
The mind experiment allows people to perceive themselves perceiving, but the actual practice in
an empirical experiment may “miscarry at the last moment” for the subject. However, the
practice works without having to measure it scientifically. A hand may not perceive itself
touching and an eye may not see itself seeing in a physical sense, but they can in a metaphysical
environment. Like a third eye that gazes into a painted world, a third hand can reach into an
invisible world and touch. This gaze or reach can turn around and see the subject perceiving in
this invisible world. The subject, therefore, has the ability to objectify its position as a subject.
To recognize such a perception qualifies the act as an eidetic 1 intuition. The subject moves from
acting in a situation to one where it can analyze the situation philosophically. Merleau-Ponty, in
short, says the experiment can malfunction scientifically but the theory has already evidenced its
validity to the subject philosophically and metaphysically.

1

Another use of the word “eidetic” means “of visual imagery or almost photographic accuracy.” Regarding

psychology, an experience or a memory can recall an event in minute detail using all the senses and not just images.
See <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=eidetic>. One of the objectives of phenomenology is
“describe essential structures of experience, as pure eidetic psychology” (Farber 14).
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Pedro Salinas
During the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Pedro Salinas’s
mother raises him in neighborhoods around Madrid. Salinas’s father dies when the boy poet is
eight years old (Newman 37). He studies literature and becomes a student at a residency.
During and upon completing his degrees, he teaches languages and literatures in Madrid and in
Paris while attending conferences from time to time. He meets a woman named Margarita
Bonmatí vacationing at Santa Pola on the Alicante coast during a vacation. They start a
courtship and a lengthy correspondence with each other. They marry and eventually migrate to
the United States when the Spanish Civil War erupts during the late 1930s. Salinas continues to
teach, lecture, write poetry, essays, and plays, attend conferences, and travel to various places
around the world until his death in 1951. He never returns to Spain.
A third significant person figures into the life of Pedro Salinas. A woman by the name of
Katherine Prue Reding becomes Salinas’s inspiration and lover. They meet during one of his
courses at the Universidad Internacional in 1932. He initiates the relationship and writes her
letters almost daily. The affair continues form more than two years and Salinas writes “algunos
de los más bellos poemas de amor escritos en español” (Bou and Soria 1564, footnote 473). In
February of 1935, Salinas’s wife Margarita finds out about the affair and tries to commit suicide.
Upon hearing the news, Katherine realizes the hurt she is causing and ends the physical affair in
Spain. Katherine Reding, who later marries and changes her surname to Whitmore, relates her
side of the affair and of Salinas’s reaction to Margarita:
Supuse que había llegado a su fin. Pero no para Pedro. Margarita había
sobrevivido. Él no veía ningún motive de separación. […] Parecía no ver
conflicto alguno entre su relación conmigo y con su familia. Les quería,
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respondía por ellos y en ningún momento contemplaba abandonarlos –pero me
necesitaba. Yo era su musa, su amor, su gran pasión y era tan necesaria para él
como lo eran ellos. (Whitmore 1525).
Ending the affair proves difficult because “la guerra civil y el exilio del poeta en Estados Unidos
en 1936” keep reviving it (Bou and Soria 1564, footnote 473). Katherine maintains a sporadic
correspondence with Salinas until cutting it off completely in 1947 (1619, footnote 294). Salinas
retains a love for Katherine as well as for Margarita and their children. “Margarita,” Newman
notes, “remained the continuing love of his life” (147). On the other hand, Katherine remains as
the center of his invisible, poetic creation.
Salinas becomes a prolific poet during his years in school and long after. His freestyle
verse gives a fresh outlook on love, nature, and memory in the medium. A contemporary critic
describes Salinas as a person that “tiene una visión semiplatónica” and “estudia [. . .] la caridad y
la claridad” (Moreno 51). In Francisco Javier Díez de Revenga’s introduction, he describes
Salinas as a person with a “rica personalidad” for being a “madrileño castizo” that loves “al mar
y a la luz mediterránea de sus juveniles veranos en Santa Pola [. . .]” (García 87). Upon
summarizing all of Salinas’s work, the critic categorizes him as “uno de los más destacados
poetas amorosos españoles de todos los tiempos” (88).
The descriptions are not far off. Salinas publishes several volumes of poetry on love and
nature. They reflect the events of a poetic self who intends the life-breathing scenery as well as a
beloved in full phenomenological essence. His poems use simple language to convey deep and
thought-provoking matter.
Pedro Salinas forms part of a group of Spanish poets called the Generation of ‘27. In
1927, Federico García Lorca, Jorge Guillén, Rafael Alberti, Luis Cernuda, Pedro Salinas, and
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others convene to discuss and celebrate the 300th anniversary of the death of Luis de Góngora.
Their activity, discussions, and debates fuel the participants’ ambition to experiment with current
philosophical and artistic trends. Followers and critics later name the group The Generation of
1927 to distinguish them from others belonging to The Generation of 1898. The conference
eventually summarizes the artistic period and its successes during the 1920s and 1930s. The
members of the group eventually go their separate ways during the following decades as exiles
after the Spanish Civil War.
Salinas lives during the time when existential and phenomenological philosophers enjoy
their heyday. Philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren
Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, and José Ortega y Gasset 2 develop a system to question the
preceding philosophical system. Some concepts hold sway with the artists and critics from Spain.
The philosophers’ trends shape and influence the surreal and phenomenological avenues of
artistic expression. Salinas enjoys the fraternity he has with his fellows. In his poetry, themes
relating to these trends begin to appear. One of these themes is the intentionality of touch
through the use of hands.
2

Ortega knows Pedro Salinas, the poet of our focus in this essay, personally during the early twentieth century, but

the later respects the philosopher insomuch as to follow him in political and some academic matters. Ortega does
offer a venue for Salinas to publish a one of his poems in an academic journal (Newman 49). However, Salinas
regularly criticizes his mentor in letters to friends and colleagues. In 1914, Salinas writes a letter to Ortega and
confronts him about his behavior towards Salinas. It is apparent from references in Obras completas III: Epistolario
that Salinas does not place Ortega in a good light. On another occasion, Salinas encounters Ortega and asks his
opinion about the former’s upcoming teaching position in Paris. Ortega discourages him from doing so. “Surprised,”
writes Newman, “Salinas asked Ortega for some explanation, but received no answer which satisfied him” (53).
Salinas leaves for Paris anyway, concluding that Ortega simply “no ha vivido en París” (Salinas, Cartas de amor
163).
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Salinas takes on touch as a main avenue to behold nature and the beloved. The
experience belonging to the subject performs not just a sensual role, but also an intellectual one.
When the subject touches an object, whether it is a person or a material thing, he intends the
qualities and the virtues of it within a current context. In fact, touch is paramount in establishing
a connection between the subject and the object, a connection that involves the consciousness of
the appearing object and the identity known to the subject. Touch is the more fundamental mode
of perception than sight. It reaches out to behold the object more intimately than sight.
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of reaching out to an object defines what experience is.
Phenomenology allows a person to have openness to experiences with objects and to be one with
them. We must be open in order to sense an object in its pure state, or not allow preconceived
notions to affect how we intend an object in its manifestation. So, “we are to attend to our
experiencing of the object, rather than to the object directly; and it must be ‘pure’ in the sense
that all beliefs in natural existence [. . .] are placed in abeyance” (Farber 15). Pedro Salinas’s
poetry displays amorous experiences that the poetic self has when he contemplates the visibility
of the landscape and the invisible vision of the beloved. His poetry also affords the opportunity
for the reader to ponder upon the poetic self’s experience of the beloved. This practice, or
“bracketing” as Husserl would term it, helps the reader to connect with the poetic self as he
experiences love. When readers intend the observations of the poetic self, they can see the
objects as pure sensations in themselves or memories conjuring up previous experiences of
objects. The object stays connected with the poetic self or with the surrounding world. Then the
reader synthesizes meaning of the poem by imagining a non-dualistic connection with all
perceived objects. “It is through my body,” says Merleau-Ponty, “that I understand other people,
just as it is through my body that I perceive ‘things’” (Phenomenology 216).
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Salinas expresses a similar philosophy in his own writings. He understands how one can
realize an aspect of oneself by intending a work of art or an idea. He writes in a letter to his
fiancée Margarita the following:
Cuando ante una obra de arte nos sentimos conmovidos es que ya antes nuestro
corazón había sentido esta sensación, pero no había sabido expresarla. Y si una
teoría filosófica nos satisface es porque responde a un problema que nuestro
espíritu se había planteado ya. Así el amor al arte y a la ciencia deben ser
sinceros y puros, no por vanidad de saber. Todo está en nosotros. (Cartas de
amor 64)
Nature also helps form experience when it manifests itself to the subject. Salinas uses
nature extensively and beautifully in his poetry. Nature fills a role for the poetic self while he
reflects upon its essence and meaning. Nature also integrates with experience and presents itself
purely or without preconceived ideas. 3
In one artistic stage, Salinas depends a lot on maritime entities of his youth. Through
these firsthand experiences, phenomenological concepts emerge when “El poeta habla y el mar
escucha y es contemplado, como lo son también la luz, las nubes, la espuma, los celajes, el aire,
la arena. . .” (García 88). As the poet contemplates nature, nature contemplates the poet, so that
his being integrates into the surrounding world. “La concha” is one of the best examples of this
contemplation or intentionality.
Entreabierta, curva, cóncava,
su albergue, encaracolada,

3

Chapter 3 will expound on this more when Salinas visits areas in Utah while on his way to a conference in Los

Angeles, California.
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mi mirada se hace dentro.
Azul, rosa, malva, verde,
tan sin luz, tan irisada,
tardes, cielos, nubes, soles,
crepúsculos me eterniza. (Salinas, Poesías 67)
The verses show the intentionality of nature by the poetic self and the shell’s aspects of
colors, quality, light, and profundity. The poetic self perceives the characteristics on the shell
intimately by way of the hands and eyes. The colors, its weight and textures open up numerous
experiences and the poetic self anticipates the profiles of the shell. Through his corporal
members, he perceives the clarity of existence of oceanic life and himself as part of it. This act
caresses the convergence of the subject and object into a non-dualistic entity. The poetic self
returns to the shell itself and by so doing returns to himself perceiving the shell. When his gaze
“se hace dentro,” he intends his own qualities and intends the intricacies similar to those of the
shell. The subject comes upon a revelation through this experience about himself.
The poetic self can also intend other people as subjects. The beloved in Salinas’s poetry
fulfills not just an amorous role, but an intellectual one as well in a phenomenological way.
Merleau-Ponty offers an explanation of how a body, as part of the world in which it lives,
intends another body which intends its world. He elaborates writing:
Neither body nor existence can be regarded as the original of the human being,
since they presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified or
generalized existence, and existence a perpetual incarnation. […] There is no
doubt at all that we must recognize in modesty, desire and love in general a
metaphysical significance, […] and that they are relevant to man as a
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consciousness and as a freedom. […] Saying that I have a body is thus a way of
saying that I can be seen as an object and that I try to be seen as a subject, […].
What we try to possess, then, is not just a body, but a body brought to life by
consciousness. […] The importance we attach to the body and the contradictions
of love are, therefore, related to a more general drama which arises from the
metaphysical structure of my body, which is both an object for others and a
subject for myself. (Phenomenology 192-94, italics in original)
The poetic self in Salinas’s poetry is no exception. He intends the beloved and ponders
on his beloved’s intentionality of him. We see this in the following poem:
El alma tenías
tan clara y abierta,
que yo nunca pude
entrarme en tu alma.
[…………………….]
¿En dónde empezaba?
¿Acabada, en dónde?
Me quedé por siempre
sentado en las vagas
lindes de tu alma. (Salinas, Poesías 11-12)
The poetic self intends the presentations the beloved gives him. However, the understanding of
this intentionality presents an incomplete one. The poetic self does the same with his own soul,
for without the beloved, he cannot penetrate his own presentations of identity. The poetic self
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does not know the mind of the beloved, but it is safely implied the beloved intends him in the act.
She also intends herself as she looks at him, but her experience may differ.
We have discussed that the hands are one way to intend an object and that touch is the
baser form of perception than sight. The hands’ functions incorporate into the subject’s
intentionality of objects. Hands express the will of the subject. We have also discussed
examples from Ortega and Merleau-Ponty where hands move either a cube, an orange, or in my
example, a globe. Salinas offers yet another example, but this time the object is the hand itself.
In an imaginary form, Salinas poem tries to perform the experiment Merleau-Ponty sets up
earlier with intending a hand touching. In the poem “Mis ojos ven en el árbol,” the subject
meditates upon the “mano de ciego” as it searches for fruit on the tree.
Mis manos se van certeras
a cogerlo. Pero tú,
pero tú, mano de ciego,
¿qué estás haciendo?
La mano da vueltas, vueltas
por el aire; si se posa
sobre cosa material,
huye tras palpo suave,
sin llegar nunca a cogerla.
[…………………………..]
Cuando se cansa de inútiles
devaneos, tristemente,
se va en busca de su hermana
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y se entrecruzan las manos
del ciego.
Y sólo así están quietas,
enclavijadas,
asidas ansia con ansia
y deseo con deseo. (Salinas, Poesías 4-5)
The hand invokes a will the poetic self does not realize before. He ponders why his hand
attempts to find a particular form of intentionality. When the hand comes upon only an empty
intention, it falls back upon a previously filled intention of another hand, or “su hermana.”
Merleau-Ponty’s experiment emerges when the hands hold themselves “asidas, ansia con ansia /
y deseo con deseo” (5).
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and Salinas’s artistic style are compatible. The first explains
how someone can intend the appearance of objects and how the same responds to those objects.
The second provides a poetic example of intentionality using hands as a means to know the
beloved, respond to her, and invoke experiences of her in material objects. Each wants to get to
the essence of the objects themselves.
The verses not previously cited in “Mis ojos ven en el árbol” deal with the blind man’s
hand as the ability to gaze the visible and invisible worlds. “Of all of our senses,” admits
Descartes, “touch is the one considered the least deceptive and most certain” (82). The hand
reaches out to understand the world before it. The hand wants to penetrate the darkness and
behold as spectacle the world it holds. The hand moves to intend all sides of the object, to see
the essence of presences. The hand through writing wants to express the spectacle and connect
with other readers. The hand is:
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[………………………………..]
Siempre abierta. Es que no sabe
cerrarse, es que tiene
ambiciones más profundas
que las de los ojos, tiene
ambiciones de esa bola
imperfecta de este mundo,
buen fruto para una mano
de ciego, ambición de luz,
eterna ambición de asir
lo inasidero.
[………………………………..]
Mano de ciego no es ciega:
una voluntad la manda,
no los ojos de su dueño. (Salinas, Poesías 5)
Phenomenology, in and of itself, does not develop as a distinct branch of philosophy until
Husserl and his counterparts take up the mission in the nineteenth century. Before
phenomenology gets its start, Descartes explains experience as a dualism between the subject
and the object; in other words, things that appear in the mind of the observer have distinct
existences from things that are outside the mind. This dualism signifies that there is a separation
of opposing ideas and everything that surrounds Descartes, and us, has a separate existence
outside the beholder’s mind. The object is just an image, and unless I can see it, the appearance
of the image slips out of existence.
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However, phenomenology attempts to explain objects outside ourselves as not just
objects. Objects have significance, and even if I close my eyes, can I still retain an image of the
object? Phenomenology maintains a person can perceive an object as something more than the
sum of its parts. My experience of it can elicit memories, goals, other objects, and even myself
perceiving it. I can understand the object when it is propped against an appropriate context or
background. Even if it is outside my field of perception, I can still contemplate its existence.
The object’s absence can present experience as presence. In essence, the object not only exists in
and of itself, but it exists for me as well as I exist for it. I receive these essences as a dative of
manifestations, to use Sokolowski’s term. He defines this term in the following citation:
We can evidence the way things are; when we do so, we discover objects, but we
also discover ourselves, precisely as datives of disclosure, as those to whom
things appear. Not only can we think the things given to us in experience; we can
also understand ourselves as thinking them. Phenomenology is precisely this sort
of understanding: phenomenology is reason’s self-discovery in the presence of
intelligible objects. (Sokolowski 4, italics in original)
The reflection that comes about between the object and me connects us in a way that we become
one even though we cannot be one in a physical sense. The object and my perception of it are
not separate entities, but come from and are the same entity.
Intentionality
The term intentionality lies at the heart of phenomenology. The root of the word may
give the impression of fulfilling goals or outcomes, but that is not the case. The term, according
to Sokolowski, “should not be confused with ‘intention’ as the purpose we have in mind when
we act” towards an object (8). Instead, the term applies to how we behold appearances and
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experiences. 4 Smith defines the term as “the directedness of experience toward things in the
world, the property of consciousness that it is a consciousness of or about something” (Section 1).
Each person has a distinct intentionality, a field of view that corresponds to that individual, and
appearances, or objects, reside within this field of view. Simply, intentionality in all its forms
directs itself to an object, whether it exists or not. It also involves sensing an essence of an
object. I can see objects before me. I can imagine objects when I daydream or carry out a
thought experiment. I can decide a course of action if someone comes to me with a problem. I
can have a memory of a situation that has happened in the past. Husserl states:
Universally it belongs to the essence of every actional cogito to be consciousness
of something. […] All mental processes having these essential properties in
common are also called “intentive mental processes” (acts in the broadest sense
of the Logische Untersuchungen); in so far as they are consciousness of
something, they are said to be “intentively referred” to this something. […] One
easily sees, that is, that not every really inherent moment in the concrete unity of
an intentive mental process itself has the fundamental characteristic,
intentionality, thus the property of being “consciousness of something.” (Ideas
73-75, italics in original)
Intentionality also directs itself towards objects through other senses. Not only can I see
a chair in a room, but I can also hear the sound of a television program. I can smell the scent of
toasted bread from the kitchen. I can touch the carpet fabric with my hand. I can taste the
sweetness of sugar in a cookie. The objects in these examples present themselves to me and are
objects of my intentionality. Their intelligibilities offer other ways for me to experience

4

Unless otherwise noted, the word intention and its related forms found in this work will follow this definition.
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manifestations of life. “For phenomenology,” notes Sokolowski, “there are no ‘mere’
appearances, and nothing is ‘just’ an appearance” (15).
Intentionality does not just show a perceived object. It can specialize into different
categories of perception. I have a memory of seeing a sketch of the Eiffel Tower in a coloring
book when I was a boy. I later visit the Eiffel Tower as a teenager on a tour with a high school
class. The photo I develop after visiting the Eiffel Tower gives me a different representation that
helps me recall an experience. In all, I have three different intentionalities. In each case I intend
the same object, but each carries a different significance.
René Descartes also talks about this concept, but he asserts the objects we intend may not
have an ontological significance. He bases his observations on current trends of physics and
claims that humans perceive things in dualistic ways. Dualism is the idea that images of the
world and images in the mind are not the same. Descartes believes objects in the mind are truer
forms. He categorizes objects in this way:
All the objects of our perception we regard either as things, or affections of things,
or else as eternal truths which have no existence outside our thought. […] But I
recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first, intellectual or thinking things,
i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; and secondly, material
things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body. (208)
An argument phenomenology has against Descartes is that he ignores “the reality of the
appearance of things” (Sokolowski 15). Empiricists believe in order for an object to exist, it
must be observed and measured beyond subjectivity. Scientists and philosophers must measure
attributes precisely to come to a valid conclusion. If a person cannot measure an object, then that
person cannot arrive at an empirically valid conclusion of the object. Emotions and beliefs are
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hard to quantify. How does someone measure love or anger? The person feeling these emotions
may be able to attribute a value, but others cannot know if the value judgment has merit or not.
Objectivity becomes an issue. Empiricists stress the importance of measuring data consistently.
If each person were to measure experience in his or her own way, aberrations would virtually
make conclusions impossible. An arbitrary authority steps in, chooses a system, and ignores
other alternatives as viable avenues of truth. The scientific method, in its general form, assumes
the higher authority in philosophical and scientific matters. Therefore, if an appearance cannot
be measured empirically, it remains just an appearance.
Scientists, like Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein, follow the empirical way of
observing appearances through measurements and mathematics, but unobservable judgments like
emotions or beliefs never get consideration. When confusion arises regarding knowing truth
through emotion, empiricists reach a paradox and stumble trying to resolve the discrepancy
through measurable data. But the conclusion empiricists strive for does not formulate because of
empirical technicalities. If these philosophers allow belief, emotions, and appearances to have a
say, some paradoxes would get resolved. Phenomenology offers the chance to ponder upon
these objects that other fields do not allow. Contemplation and theory about all sorts of
appearances afford thinkers opportunities to study them in ways other fields forbid.
Intentionality, whether anticipated, experienced, remembered, or imagined, whether present to
the beholder or absent for centuries, allows the thinker to unveil a potential truth and gain access
to that truth. Appearances of all forms help the thinker to gain access to possible truths in his
philosophical inquiry.
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Perception
One finds it harder to define what perception is when asked. Many theories offer to
summarize what perception entails. The current fashion concerning perception in our
postmodern world views it as an act to be seriously questioned. One example of this thought
stems from the movie entitled The Matrix in which perception is nothing more than a program
code showering green numbers, letters, and figures forming physical structures and sensations.
Phenomenology does not hold such an idea. Phenomenology simply states that we can
understand appearances according to what does and does not appear. Context plays a role in
interpreting the intelligibility of an object. There is meaning behind objects, but it is not sinister
like the ominous, green figures portrayed in The Matrix. Rather, an object’s essence can emerge
as one ponders upon it. The knowledge of an object lies beyond its mere physicality and
continues beyond in a potentially infinite space. I can intend an object and observe its surface
area. I can also ponder what I know about it. The knowledge I gain acts as a light penetrating a
metaphysical darkness. I sense its texture, color, and composition. The knowledge that I do not
gain lies beyond in the darkness. I can sense something lies beyond, but I may not be able to
grasp it mentally, although the infinite gaze of my mind’s eye can continue forever. Further
knowledge of the object that lies beyond the darkness may not express itself, but it does not
mean that it does not exist.
Phenomenology analyzes the connection between objects that exist with subjects that
perceive the world. Those objects contain what are called sides, aspects, and profiles that the
subject can anticipate when he or she lets them appear (Sokolowski 20). All is related one with
another in non-dualistic perception. Maurice Merleau-Ponty wants to “leave behind us, once and
for all, the traditional subject-object dichotomy” that Descartes created (Phenomenology 202).

26

The poet discussed in the next chapter offers us a non-dualistic role of perception in daily events.
Nature, body, and art are used in the majority of his works, and show the necessary vehicle of
perception focusing on motor sensory functions.
The non-dualistic perception happens when observers realize they direct themselves to
objects of perception and not as passive sensors of stimuli. Heidegger notes:
What we concisely call perception is, more explicitly formulated, the perceptual
directing of oneself toward what is perceived, in such a way indeed that the
perceived is itself always understood as perceived in its perceivedness. […] In it
we are saying that perception and perceived belong together in the latter’s
perceivedness. In speaking of perceptual directedness-toward or of directingoneself-toward we are saying that the belonging together of the three moments of
perception is in each case a character of this directedness-toward. This
directedness-toward constitutes, as it were, the framework of the whole
phenomenon “perception.” (57, italics in original)
Merleau-Ponty considers the form and perception using a cube instead of a spherical
object. He writes,
From the point of view of my body I never see as equal the six sides of the cube,
even if it is made of glass, and yet the word ‘cube’ has a meaning; the cube itself,
the cube in reality, beyond its sensible appearances, has its six equal sides. As I
move round it, I see the front face, hitherto a square, change its shape, then
disappear, while the other sides come into view and one by one become squares.
But the successive stages of this experience are for me merely the opportunity of
conceiving the whole cube with its six equal and simultaneous faces, the
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intelligible structure which provides the explanation of it. And it is even
necessary, for my tour of inspection of the cube to warrant the judgement: ‘here is
a cube’, that my movements themselves be located in objective space and, far,
from its being the case that the experience of my own movement conditions the
position of an object that I am able to interpret perceptual appearance and
construct the cube as it truly is. (Phenomenology 235-36, italics in original)
Presence and Absence
Presence and absence are easy to define. I can define a presence as anything or anyone in
close proximity to me. When I teach a class, the student or students I teach are present. Absence,
of course is the opposite. An absence is anything or anyone that is not in close proximity to me.
A student who is sick or unable to come to class is absent when I do not see that student while I
teach. In a first-person point of view, we can sense within ourselves thoughts, beliefs, emotions,
and unseen objects as present or absent. I can feel anger presently or not. I can sense something
is missing like an article of clothing when I forget something or food in my stomach when I
hunger. The binary opposition is easily clear. Phenomenology studies these two attributes as
well. Husserl calls filled intentions “acts” that direct to “an expressed object [that] means
something, and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective. This objective
somewhat can either be actually present through accompanying intuitions, or may at least appear
in representation, e.g. in a mental image” (Logical 280, italics in original). For empty intentions,
he says, “But if the object is not intuitively before one, and so not before one as a named or
meant object, mere meaning is all there is to it” (280). In other words, John J. Drummond
defines these intentions in this manner:
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An empty intention is one that re-presents or makes present an object that is
absent to consciousness. Empty intentions are contrasted with full intentions.
Full intentions either present an object intuitively by containing sensuous contents
that directly present a side or aspect of the object, or they present an object that,
while not intuitively present, is presented with the aid of contents that are represented by virtue of the living present’s retention or previously experienced
(erlebt) sensuous contents. (66-67, italics in original)
Many philosophers have asked about the presence of things, but the discussion of absence
has been sorely lacking. Phenomenologists question previous philosophers about this negligence.
Edmund Husserl discusses the reality of appearances even if such cannot be measured
objectively. Whereas most appearances are illusions according to empiricists, Husserl argues
that appearances indicate either an absence or a presence of an object. Husserl and his
contemporaries coin the phrases filled intention and empty intention in order to illustrate the
experiences we have when we perceive an object.
Fortunately, empty intentions can become filled intentions. Returning to the one cent
coin, I turn it. As I flip it to see the reverse side, the obverse disappears from my view. I see the
edge of the coin and then the other side. Lincoln’s bust disappears and the building of the
Lincoln Memorial appears within my vision. The obverse now faces away from me and the
reverse stands at attention. The reverse was an empty intention before, and now it is a filled
intention. I have come to see the other side of the coin. However, in order to behold the reverse
of the coin, I had to sacrifice something. The thing I sacrificed was the intention I had of the
obverse side, or Lincoln’s bust. When I sacrifice the intention, it becomes an empty intention.
Fortunately, an empty intention can become filled again. There are two sides of a coin, to put it
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literally. For every intention I have, there is an empty intention; and for every empty intention
that becomes filled, the previous intention is sacrificed. It is impossible to behold an empty
intention and a filled intention of an object at the same time.
Even though it is impossible to behold an empty intention and a filled intention of an
object at the same time, it does not mean I cannot experience the reality of holding or seeing a
one cent coin. Each angle I have of the penny expresses a distinct side, aspect, and profile.
Empty intentions and filled intentions are in constant flux whether I move the penny or I move
myself to see it. Yet each moment I intend the penny does not mean I perceive a different penny.
On the contrary, I collect these images and relate them to one and the same object. MerleauPonty explains that even if we cannot see the hidden sides of an object while viewing the shown
sides, it does not mean the hidden sides have ceased to exist. Psychologists may claim we
imagine representations, but Merleau-Ponty argues they are not representations, but existing
essences. Mathematicians may posit scientific formulas to the trueness of the hidden sides, but
that fails too because we do not use geometry to prove to ourselves the hidden sides exist.
Merleau-Ponty writes:
I grasp the unseen side as present, and I do not affirm that the back of the lamp
exists in the same sense that I say the solution of a problem exists. The hidden
side is present in its own way. It is in my vicinity. […] It is […] a kind of
practical synthesis: I can touch the lamp, and not only the side turned toward me
but also the other side; I have only to extend my hand to hold it. (The Primacy 14)
The intentions we have of an object contribute to the identity of the object. The object
also presents itself to us. We receive the appearance in a privileged state because we allow the
object to appear to us. When one contemplates the significance of empty and filled intentions, as
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well as appearances, we rediscover the object as something extraordinary and cease to take it for
granted.
Intuition is a term related to filled intention. However, it implies a moment in the
subject’s experience when he or she realizes what the object is. There is another type of intuition
that goes deeper. In the case of my penny, if I want to have an eidetic intuition with it, I need to
find its form or essence. I need to have a deeper insight about what makes a penny, a penny.
Husserl writes:
Of whatever sort intuition of something individual may be, whether it be adequate
or inadequate, it can take the turn into seeing an essence; and this seeing, whether
it be correspondingly adequate or correspondingly inadequate, has the
characteristic of a presentive act. But the following is implicit in this: […] the
essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or
experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a
pure essence. (Ideas 9, italics in original)
The arrival at an essence of an object is a difficult task. There are three steps to arrive at
an eidetic intuition. The first step is to identify what phenomenology calls typicality
(Sokolowski 178). This step is easy to achieve. I see several pennies in my collection and I
notice each one has a mint mark, is made of copper, or carries the same design. However,
subtleties distinguish these pennies by different years they show, different designs, different
compositions of metal, or even counterfeits. The second step is finding an empirical universal
(178). An empirical universal is an attribute that I see consistently through experience. An
empirical universal I can safely attribute to pennies deal with mottos, slogans, and names. After
shuffling through thousands of coins, I notice each has words like “United States of America,”
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“E pluribus unum,” “Liberty,” and “In God We Trust.” I have yet to see a modern US penny not
have one of those characteristics. If one does not have any or all of these attributes, and still
retains the name of penny, it becomes an unusual exception. Therefore, I conclude to have an
empirical universal that all pennies minted by the US Mint have these attributes. This empirical
universal is not sufficient to reach an eidetic intuition. My claim can be falsified by a penny with
a missing slogan which the mint inadvertently left out during the process. I have yet to find the
essence of a penny. In order to get to an eidetic intuition, I must find an attribute that if I take it
away from the object, the object falls apart. One possible eidetic intuition a penny has is its
name. It is the word that we attribute to it so that we can know it. Without the name “penny,”
“coin,” or “cent,” its essence collapses and the object loses its transcendental value. MerleauPonty reiterates that speech allows us to take possession of the object’s essence in form and not
in concept.
The denomination of objects does not follow upon recognition; it is itself
recognition. When I fix my eyes on an object in the half-light, and say: ‘It is a
brush’, there is not in my mind the concept of a brush, under which I subsume the
object, and which moreover is linked by frequent association with the word
‘brush’, but the word bears the meaning, and, by imposing it on the object, I am
conscious of reaching that object. As has often been said, for the child the thing is
not known until it is named, the name is the essence of the thing and resides in it
on the same footing as its colour and its form. For pre-scientific thinking, naming
an object is causing it to exist or changing it: God creates beings by naming them
and magic operates upon them by speaking of them. These ‘mistakes’ would be
unexplainable if speech rested on the concept, for the latter ought always to know
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itself as distinct from the former, and to know the former as an external
accompaniment. (Phenomenology 206)
Essence forms the constitution of an object. To find the essence of the object, the goal is
to find the unchanging characteristics of the object. If we were to take away those characteristics,
we would be left with an object that falls apart. Merleau-Ponty elaborates on Husserl’s concept
of intuiting this essence. He says:
This intuition of essences […] is based on facts. […] In order to grasp an essence,
we consider a concrete experience, and then we make it change in our thought,
trying to imagine it as effectively modified in all respects. That which remains
invariable through these changes is the essence of the phenomena in question.
For example, if we are seeking to form an idea of, or to understand the essence of,
a spatial figure, such as this lamp, we must first perceive it. Then we will imagine
all the aspects contained in this figure as changed. That which cannot be varied
without the object itself disappearing is the essence. […] That which does not
vary through all conceivable variations will be the essence. Even when one thinks
in terms of the pure essence, one always thinks of the visible—the fact. (The
Primacy 70, italics in original)
Memory also has a distinct attribute in phenomenology. Memory is a certain kind of
experience in which a subject virtually relives a previous experience. Memory is special because
the object we intend brings “a new noematic layer: as remembered, as past” (Sokolowski 67).
When we remember an object or an experience, we recall not just what we saw before, but also
what we perceived through our senses. The conclusion that memories are like family home
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videos that display a series of pictoral appearances is insufficient. To explain the concept
properly, it requires a lengthy citation in the following paragraph:
[W]hat we store up as memories is not images of things we perceived at one time.
Rather, we store up the earlier perceptions themselves. We store up the
perceptions we once lived through. Then, when we actually remember, we do not
call up images; rather, we call up those earlier perceptions. When these
perceptions are called up and reenacted, they bring along their objects, their
objective correlates. What happens in remembering is that we relive earlier
perceptions, and we remember the objects as they were given at that time. We
capture that earlier part of our intentional life. We bring it to life again. That is
why memories can be so nostalgic. They are not just reminders, they are the
activity of reliving. The past comes to life again, along with the things in it, but it
comes to life with a special kind of absence, one that we cannot bridge by going
anywhere, as we can bridge the absences of the other side of the table by going
over to another part of the room and looking at it from there. (Sokolowski 67-68)
Memory, it seems, is the only type of absence that the subject cannot move in order to fill an
intention. Memory conjures up experiences we had and includes sight, sounds, smells, touch,
tastes, emotions, and ideas. It contains a portion of an essence we took from the object.
Another way of finding essence is to consider the evidence or context in which the object
appears. Evidence has the ability to change the subject and the object into a different being. In
order for evidence to be achieved, the subjects must realize exactly what the objects represent as
well as exactly how they understand themselves within that context. These events usually
express themselves in ways only one subject can experience at a time. Ironically, empiricists
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start out looking for this type of evidence through scientific observations, but later impede
subjectivity by relying only on objectivism and psychologism. 5
We have looked at various examples of objects in relation to their sides, aspects, and
profiles. We have also discussed briefly the significance of an object in relation to other contexts.
The meaning of the object varies in many ways depending on the situation or the relation the
object has with the subject. The significance becomes deeper as the object reveals its identity in
a manifold of ways. The penny I use in my example means one thing when I hold it in my hand
and say, “This is my coin,” “The coin is in my hand,” or “I hold the coin.” All of these moments
express the same object, although in subtle ways. The object expresses more things if my father
holds it and says, “This is my coin.” It changes further if my grandfather holds it and says, “This
is my coin.” All of us direct our intentions to the coin and it manifests an identity. The
presentations of the coin gains a complex identity the more subjects direct their intentions to it.
A coin I find on the sidewalk manifests a different identity than another that I inherit from my
mother who, in turn, inherited it from her father. The coin I inherit carries more power because I
intend it more powerfully. Its presence appears before my perception and I allow it to show its
identity to me. It also helps me invoke memories I have of people or things that have now
become absences. It invokes experiences I recall again and again.
Sokolowski gives his version of an identity of a manifold of presentations in a technical
way. He elaborates saying:
When we wish to express something, we can always distinguish between the
expression and what is expressed, the exprimend. If I say, “The snow has covered
the street,” “The street is covered with snow,” and “Die Strasse ist verschneit,” I

5

For a discussion on this issue, please see Dan Zahavi’s work Husserl’s Phenomenology, pages 125-33.
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have uttered three different expressions, but I can consider all three of them to
have expressed one and the same meaning or exprimend, one and the same fact or
bit of information. The three expressions are like three aspects of one and the
same object, except that in this case the object is complicated and its status in
being is different from that of a cube. I could amplify the manifold still further by
intoning my sentences in different ways: by shouting the sentence once, then
whispering it, then saying it in a high-pitched voice, and so on. These would all
be various ways of presenting one and the same sentence, and yet all the
utterances and all the sentences (and many possible others as well) would present
one and the same meaning, and one and the same act. (27-28)
An identity in a manifold of presentations suggests any object can change depending on
its circumstance as a meaning. A person who sees an appearance of a woman cherishing a coin
lovingly in her hand will sense an aspect differently than if the same person sees a boy twirling
the same coin on a table. A better example includes a work of art in which many patrons intend
it and yet elicit a distinct response.
The dualism of Descartes leaves questions regarding the reality of those appearances and
their hidden sides. Merleau-Ponty contributed to the discussion by analyzing how the body
senses the world in an implied and unconscious manner. He establishes his theory on the
paintings of Cézanne, behaviorism, and psychology to explain how we perceive the visible and
the invisible worlds. Artists have the power to use their intentionalities and perceptions of
presences and absences to convert the visible world into spectacle. Salinas uses such a method
to perceive the world before him and changes it into poetry. The motifs of hand as a
representation of ambition, will, and tactile intentionality corroborate the revelation of the
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essences of objects. Salinas probes into the essences of objects and by so doing uses the gaze to
see “according to” the appearances witnessed by the poetic self.
In the next chapter, we will find concepts of phenomenology in Salinas’s poem “La
memoria en las manos.” The poem situates itself within a collection of poems entitled Largo
Lamento. The collection published posthumously figures into two other collections entitled La
voz a ti debida and Razón de Amor. They form a trilogy that exposits the cycle of a love affair.
The poetic self focuses his intentionality on a stone and the hands. Through these objects, the
poetic self revives the experience of joy and love he receives from his now absent beloved. The
significance of these actions shows how his ambition and will display the essences of these
objects. The poem shows how phenomenological intentionality allows the poetic self to
commune with the beloved long after she has left. It also shows how the poetic self hears an
unmentioned third person figure into the situation. The absent beloved and the unmentioned
individual intertwine as the poetic self’s center of attention. They become the essence that shows
how the beloved is the center of the poetic self’s visible surroundings and invisible poetic world.

37

Chapter 2: “La memoria en las manos”
During the time Pedro Salinas, Margarita Bonmatí, and Katherine Whitmore form a love
triangle, Salinas writes three collections of poetry: La voz a ti debida, Razón de Amor, and Largo
Lamento. The first two appear while Salinas is in Spain while the last appears posthumously.
Salinas ponders upon love between a man and a woman in these collections of poems. Salinas
publishes the first two collections in 1933 and 1936 respectively. He works on poems between
1936 and 1939 during the Spanish Civil War and while he resides in Massachusetts separated
from his family. However, Largo Lamento comes later than anticipated. The publication in its
entirety does not happen until 1975—twenty-four years after Salinas’s death. Salinas does not
publish the last volume while he teaches at Wellesley College. Nevertheless, his son-in-law Juan
Marichal and his daughter Soledad Salinas edit numerous poems and complete the project
(Escartín 14). Enric Bou and Andrés Soria Olmedo believe they know why: “Ahora se entiende
por qué Salinas nunca quiso publicar Largo lamento, puesto que es un libro fallido, no terminado”
(49). By 1995, all three collections appear in one volume under the direction of Montserrat
Escartín. He says, “Sólo es posible entender los dos primeros títulos salinianos enmarcados en el
cielo que forman junto a Largo, en un proceso amoroso que va desde el encuentro; en intento del
enamorado por descubrir la esencia de la amada, en La Voz; el hallazgo de la pareja y despedida
parcial, en Razón; y el final doloroso tras el reencuentro imposible de Largo” (Escartín 17).
Largo Lamento becomes a third act of a story begun by La voz a ti debida and Razón de Amor
and clarifies the motivations of the participants involved in the relationship. Despite this
categorization, Bou and Soria stress “con sorpresa que la famosa trilogía amorosa no existe” (49).
Upon reviewing these collections, Montserrat Escartín has outlined that together they
form a cycle experienced by a poetic self (17). The first celebrates the discovery of the beloved.
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The poetic self contemplates the beloved continuously and anticipates a union with the one he
loves. The second shows the breaking away of the beloved and the poetic self and the latter’s
discourse on their relationship. He realizes the beloved will become absent and tries to make
sense of the frequent empty intentions interspersed with brief filled intentions of the beloved.
The third shows the outcome of the relationship and the poetic self confronts the complete
absence of the beloved. Her inevitable absence forces the poetic self to recall memories and
contemplate the beloved in other forms. He attempts to understand the beloved completely, even
though he cannot completely do so physically in her absence. He fills her absence with
phenomenological empty intentions with other objects that remind him of his beloved.
The love affair showcases a cycle of the poetic self experiencing the intentionality of the
beloved. He contemplates the many facets of the beloved and the perception he has of her allows
the beloved to appear before him in different ways. When the facets become a complete absence
of the beloved, the poetic self replaces the absence with other objects that relate to the beloved.
The objects invoke memories of the beloved and the poetic self relives them. R. Gullón’s says
the relationship is “controlado por el juego de la inteligencia, pero dependiente de la sensualidad”
during the affair (Escartín 22). This intellectual love strays from romantic conventions in that
lovers are not meant to reach each other because it allows the poetic self to create a world in
which he beholds her presence continuously. Salinas gives an opportunity to see
phenomenological and existential philosophies integrate into his poetry.
A pivotal poem in Largo Lamento is “La memoria en las manos.” The poem and the
work itself exemplifies the concept of empty intentionality in phenomenology by following the
poetic self’s contemplation of the beloved in her absence. We will observe these characteristics
in this poem and see them in context to other poems found within the trilogy.
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The context of “La memoria en las manos” places it as the fourteenth poem in Largo
Lamento. The poetic self’s intentionality directs itself to memories of objects and the beloved
herself in absence. The structure of the poem begins with a preamble followed by two longer
sections revolving around a stone and the beloved’s head. The preamble shows how hands can
serve as the poetic self’s will to comprehend and remember. In the act of perceiving objects, or
intending them, the hands serve to fill absences with images and presences for the poetic self.
The hands’ sense of touch substitutes the visual absence of the beloved. Touch ameliorates the
emptiness that the eyes cannot fill readily. The poetic self says the hands are working in place of
the heart, mind, or soul. The mind remembers but the hands revive the memory because they
form part of the body as well as the mind. The poetic self explains that “El alma no se acuerda,
está dolida / de tanto recordar” (LL 1 1888-89). The hands mitigate this pain by displacing the
intentionality of the beloved to the act of touch. The body has the ability to remember, not just
the mind, because “my body is a thing among things; it is one of them,” says Merleau-Ponty, “It
is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing” (“Eye and Mind” 125).
The preamble sets up the premise of the poem. The poetic self splits his intention into
two different entities. These memories bring back the beloved into a remembered presence. The
invocation of the beloved through memory is like a painting of a subject that has since passed
away. Merleau-Ponty says, “Things have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse in me a
carnal formula of their presence. […] It is not a faded copy, a trompe l’œil, or another thing”
(126, italics in original). The objects intended in the poem emit a presence of the beloved
1

For purposes of convenience, I have decided to follow Montserrat Escartín Gual’s system of distinguishing

between the three collections of poems he uses in his edition. Unless otherwise noted, all citations hereafter will
follow this system: La voz a ti debida (Voz), Razón de Amor (Razón), and Largo Lamento (LL). All abbreviated
titles and quoted poetry, of course, belong to Pedro Salinas and are found under his name in the Bibliography.
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already within the poetic self’s essence. The poetic self sets up the principal idea of the poem’s
existence: “Pero en las manos / queda el recuerdo de lo que han tenido” (LL 1890-91). The use
of the present perfect in the case indicates that the poetic self’s has not forgotten the beloved
despite her absence and that the past action still has relevance in the present. He wants to relive
the experience he had when she was a presence. The contemplation invokes a presence of the
beloved through memory of a past moment. As for the author who wrote the poem, he invokes
this memory in a letter to Katherine who works as a program director for students of Smith
College studying abroad in Spain: “Pero, […] te aseguro que tu ausencia era la mayor presencia
de la clase ayer. No estando la llenabas toda” (Salinas, Obras 288). However this does not
mean that Margarita is out of the picture. “It is not unthinkable,” writes Newman, “that the
essential focus of the love theme as developed later in La voz may have had its genesis in Salinas’
outpourings to Margarita” (57). Katherine confirms this in part writing, “Es cierto que poemas
[…] pertenecen claramente a nuestro amor naciente, pero otros, sumamente apasionados,
implican una experiencia que no conocimos” (Whitmore 1524). The beloved incorporates all
these characteristics. I believe Margarita cannot be completely ignored when I consider the
formation of the beloved.
The presence of the beloved despite her absence coincides with Merleau-Ponty’s example
in “Eye and Mind.” “The animals painted on the walls of Lascaux are not there in the same way
as are the fissures and limestone formations. Nor are they elsewhere” (126, italics in original).
The beloved’s presence and memory are not there in the same way as is the stone, but neither are
they elsewhere. Memory is the key to the poetic self’s experience of the beloved. The poem
fixes his attention on the hands which then divert the intentionality to a memory of holding a
stone. Later, the attention changes the intentionality to focus on another memory, a memory of
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the beloved’s head. The memories the poetic self intends the beloved’s presence again. Let us
now turn our attention, or intention, to the stone spoken of in the poem.
The Stone
When the poetic self diverts his intentionality from emotional suffering to a blissful
memory, the object he remembers is a stone that he and the beloved have found. The poetic self
essentially conjures up a world in which he is happier and leaves the painful one behind. In this
world that he remembers, the beloved reveals her presence and he relives the experience again.
In this experience, he describes the stone and dives into its significance. One of the attributes of
the stone is its weight. The presentation of its weight gives vagueness to the poetic self. Its
ambiguity can refer to various ideas. The word peso in this context can refer to either “weight”
or “burden.” The weight applies to the physical characteristics of the stone while the burden of
having known it takes on a symbolic significance. The symbol augments its significance through
the use of the adjective áspero (LL 1896). Logically the adjective refers to the stone’s surface
that is coarse or rough.
The tactile sensation of the stone’s surface immediately calls up an emotional response
for the participants: “Pero su peso áspero, / sentir nos hace que por fin cogimos / el fruto más
hermoso de los tiempos” (LL 1896-98). Memory helps the poetic self to transport back to a place
they once enjoyed. When the poetic self recalls a memory, the contents of them are not
superficial, but are things that reveal the transcendence of objects he remembers. During the
actual moment of intentionality, the subject perceives the object and imagines it perceiving him
in a reflection that shows the subject how he acts. Lines 1892-923 of Largo Lamento
demonstrate the hands’ ability to remember a particular happy time in the poetic self’s love affair.
The stone is also that which “cogimos distraídamente / sin darnos cuenta de nuestra ventura” (LL
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1894-95). The ability to relive an experience helps the poetic self to realize another facet of the
stone that he may not have done before. The act of remembering provides him the opportunity to
reflect upon it again.
Another aspect of the stone is its essence. Objects reveal layers of identities that the
subject must discover by placing the object into contexts. The object not only exists for the
subject, but it also exists for itself. This existence shows its transcendence to the subject as being
more than just its appearance. R. A. Cardwell has seen this pattern in Salinas’s poetry. In a
literary article, he comments about the roles of memory in his art:
When we examine the work of [. . .] Salinas, [. . .] the positive aspect [. . .] is
immediately apparent. [It is] believed that through remembered experiences the
poet can discover a definition of essence, an immanent or transcendent reality for
which the existent or phenomenal entity is but an outer shell. (810)
In other words, the poetic self probes the stone’s essence by remembering the summation of its
“sides, aspects, and profiles” (Sokolowski 20).
One aspect of the stone the poetic self faces is the stone’s spatial similarity to fruit. We
have discussed briefly that the two participants felt they had found the “fruto más hermoso de los
tiempos” (LL 1898). As pertaining to the “fruto más hermoso,” this reference alludes to the fruit
mentioned in the biblical account of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden. Another ambiguity
appears as to what type of fruit the poetic self is referring to. Two fruits played opposite roles in
the biblical account. One came from the tree of eternal life that bestowed immortality and the
other came from the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil. The ambiguous reference
teases the reader to choose which of the two fruits was the “most beautiful.” It can refer to the
fruit of eternal life that bestows the gift of bliss and happiness mentioned in line 1898 of the
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poem. Arguably it can also refer to the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil which promised
power of will and choice, but caused a rough and coarse burden to be placed on the couple after
partaking of the fruit. This observation equates the love the couple feels as a worldly love
brought about by the fall felt by Adam and Eve; yet a love “que no tenía un lugar propio que
ocupar” (Whitmore 1525). Line 1899 mentions this coarse burden as a foreshadowing of the
lovers’ eventual breakup, which the current poetic self is temporarily escaping from reality.
Lines 1899-900 confirm this consequence: “A tiempo sabe / el peso de una piedra entre las
manos” (LL). The poetic self realizes the loneliness and burden he must carry with his hands,
but this does not impede him from enjoying the presence of the remembered beloved.
Other mentions of the stone and the fruit occur in other poems. In La voz a ti debida, he
recalls asking his beloved, “Di: ¿podré yo vivir / […] / como su zumo el fruto, / para mañana
tuyo?” (182-87). He also recalls intending the colors of the sky repeating themselves on the
“naranja o la piedra” which “nos cerca mirarlos” (1266-70). They foreshadow and reveal the
essence of the beloved and the poetic self’s phenomenological intentionality of her. The poetic
self again refers to fruit in “La frente es más segura.”
Besos
me entregas y dulzuras
esenciales del mundo,
en su fruto redondo,
aquí en los labios. (1905-09)
The poetic self receives kisses from his beloved in an almost similar way Adam receives the fruit
from Eve. Sweet kisses delight the poetic self. He returns sweet kisses to the beloved when she
cries. He says:
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Tú
no las puedes besar.
Las beso yo por ti.
Saben; tienen sabor
a los zumos del mundo. (2101-05)
“Los zumos del mundo” contain in these fruits foreshadow the sweet and sour taste of enjoying
the beloved’s presence, in reality and in memory. In Largo Lamento, the fruit’s juices take on a
melancholic meaning for the poetic self.
The poetic self refers to the fruit three times in Razón de Amor. He helps recalling a
memory when he tastes the “zumo de mundo inédito en la boca” of the beloved (1987). He also
recalls the responsibility they have to each other, like Adam and Eve after the fall, by reciting:
Mundo, verdad de dos, fruto de dos,
verdad paradisíaca, agraz manzana,
sólo ganada en su sabor total
cuando terminan las virginidades
del día solo y de la noche sola. (2404-08)
Yet, the poetic self cannot blame the beloved completely because they both did not take notice of:
[…] las redondas formas de cristal,
donde se maduraban, por el día,
frutos de luz, abiertos al crepúsculo,
colgando de las lámparas. (2590-93)
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The memory of the stone, which invokes the memory of the fruit, entails a will each partner has
made in the affair. As suggested by the example of Ortega y Gasset’s orange, 2 the poetic self
and the beloved have never seen the fruit’s essence completely. The stone and the fruit
intertwine with significations regarding the couple’s excitement and decisions in their
relationship, as well as the consequences of their actions. The poetic self wants a continual
presence of the beloved, but in her absence, he relies on memory instead. He concludes within
his memory of the stone and of the fruit that “A tiempo sabe / el peso de una piedra entre las
manos” (LL 1899-900).
The transcendent quality of the stone refers to a type of fruit that symbolizes knowledge,
burden, and essence similar to that which Adam and Eve had in the biblical beginning. Another
possibility appears when the poetic self shifts from a metaphorical significance to a metaphysical
one. He intends the stone within its physical boundaries and contemplates the time it takes for a
stone to get to where it is in his remembered world. He imagines a type of decision made by the
stone as though it had will and life, and he sees the result of the stone’s decision to be plain and
2

José Ortega y Gasset uses an orange as an example. He explains the need to understand that all the profiles of an

object cannot be intended all at once. Science cannot explain everything, an idea that comes from vitalism which
asserts that “processes of life are not explicable by the laws of physics and chemistry alone and that life is in some
part self-determining” (“Vitalism”). Ortega y Gasset says:
Es esta una perogrullada, mas no de todo inútil. Porque aún hay gentes las cuales exigen que les hagamos
ver todo tan claro como ven esta naranja delante de sus ojos. Y es el caso, que si por ver se entiende, como
ellos entienden, una función meramente sensitiva, ni ellos ni nadie ha visto jamás una naranja. Es esta un
cuerpo esférico, por tanto, con anverso y reverso. ¿Pretenderán tener delante a la vez el anverso y el
reverso de la naranja? Con los ojos vemos una parte de la naranja, pero el fruto entero no se nos da nunca
en forma sensible; la mayor porción del cuerpo de la naranja se halla latente a nuestras miradas. (Ortega
105-06)
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pure. The preterit form of the verb saber means to find out. This reflection lets the stone
“esperar sin pedir nada / más que la eternidad de su ser puro” (LL 1917-18). Purity then
becomes the way for the stone to avoid its own death. In other words, purity is the ability not to
envy another’s beauty. The stone’s immortality is the ability not to be completely replaced. The
stone subtly changes into a representation of a love ignored during the poetic self’s affair with
the beloved. The lover then emerges in symbols of petals and flight. The poetic self ponders
upon the revocation of the “pétalo” and the “vuelo” (1919). The petal and flight associate with
the flower and dragonfly as fleeting superficial existences. Upon comparing the dragonfly and
the lilies to the stone’s immortality, the poetic self proclaims that the stone “está viva y me
enseña / que un amor debe estarse quizá quieto, muy quieto” (1920-21). The stone’s stillness
associates with the poetic self’s desire for knowledge of how he can “soltar las falsas alas de la
prisa,” (1922). The poetic self dives deeply and meditatively just by remembering his holding
the stone. He desires to become the beloved in order to be one with her without the need of
proximity.
The stone in our core poem alludes to this unification in “Para vivir no quiero.” The
poetic self expresses his desire to love the beloved purely. The beloved asks the poetic self, who
calls her, and he responds by promising to do away with all names, histories, and obligations
imposed upon him. He tries to become pure as well. Having done so, he states:
Y vuelto ya al anónimo
eterno del desnudo,
de la piedra, del mundo,
te diré:
“Yo te quiero, soy yo.” (Voz 517-21)

47

The stone symbolizes the poetic self’s desire to become pure or to intend the beloved in a pure
state, a state that allows lovers to give their all, to give on equal footing. Not only that, but it
serves the desire of the poetic self to go “rompiendo todo” (514). The purity that he seeks is not
one in which signs and significations encumber the beloved. This purity is what Merleau-Ponty
explains as “brute expression” (“Indirect” 88). “Now art,” he claims, “draws upon this fabric of
brute meaning […]. Art and only art does so in full innocence” (“Eye and Mind” 123). This
brute expression also leads the poetic self to search for an eidetic intuition of the beloved. The
brute expression or eidetic intuition means an essence that, if taken away, the object would cease
to be what it is. In the introduction, the object’s name constitutes part of the object’s essence. A
nameless object does not exist in a vacuum; even an object with “no name” has that distinction
as a name, for “no name” is a name. The essence breaks down if truly the function of the name
breaks away from the object. Hence, in “Para vivir no quiero,” the beloved’s name reduces itself
to its most common denominator. The poetic self reduces the beloved to an eidetic intuition, a
brute expression with a proper pronoun tú.
The philosophical exercise continues to unfold within this stone’s essence, brute
expression, or purity. The poetic self chimes:
Se estuvo siempre quieta,
sin buscar, encerrada,
en una voluntad densa y constante
de no volar como la mariposa,
de no ser bella, como el lirio,
para salvar de envidias su pureza. (LL 1908-13)
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The poetic self notices the stillness of the stone. It does not search. The stone encloses a “dense
and constant will” to not desire the flight of the butterfly or the beauty of the lily. It does this not
to envy what others have or can do. This preserves its purity. The poetic self wonders how the
stone can be so content by being so plain. He may also wonder how to find beauty and
intelligence that lasts longer than a lily or a dragonfly. The answers are not readily available.
The vagueness and other sides resist his philosophical probing. This is the point where
conscious intentionality of the beloved probing, spiritual light reaches a limit. When there is a
filled intention, there is always an empty intention, another side.
The poetic self interjects as he contemplates the lilies and the dragonflies that have died
near the stone. He uses the verb correr to denote hurry or the passing of time. The beauty
reflected in flora and fauna is ephemeral. This troubles the poetic self because his focus belongs
to an intellectual love. He reflects upon the eons through which the stone witnesses the cycles of
life and death. This “other side” goes on infinitely and the poetic self can spend a lifetime trying
to reach a complete understanding of an object’s essence. Salinas deals with this problem as
well when he remembers his beloved. Salinas has written in a letter to his fiancée Margarita that
while he anticipates her through an empty intention, he mentally positions himself “con una
mano apoyada en la piedra, para poder verte y hablarte bien” (Salinas, Cartas de amor 97-98).
The filled intention of the stone also attempts to understand the personality and intentions of the
beloved. He sees the beloved in the essence of the stone, through it, and because of it. At this
point, I am distinguishing the stone as the poetic self’s other love that he forsakes in order to
pursue the lover, because the lover, in this memory, is holding the stone with the poetic self, the
stone “que cogimos distraídamente / sin darnos cuenta de nuestra ventura” (LL 1894-95).
Salinas sheds light on this in one of his letters to Katherine. He writes about the love triangle
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they experience. He has feelings of guilt and senses the precarious nature of the relationship. He
realizes this when he stays home sick in bed one day. This is what he relates to Katherine:
Mi mujer me daba compañía, asistencia solícita, cuidado, atención, me miraba
cariñosamente. Y entonces es, Katherine, cuando nada material ni afectuoso me
faltaba (cuando yo, de ser un cobarde, un cómodo, hubiera debido sentirme mejor,
no echar de menos nada, reconciliarme con la materialidad de mi vida), entonces
es cuando te echaba de menos con más ardor y sentía más pena por Margarita.
¡Cómo se me ha aparecido la inevitabilidad de todo, la delicia y maravillosa
dificultad de todo, la grandeza que la vida tiene en sus nudos, en sus
complicaciones! Tres seres somos, Katherine, decías tú, hace poco. Ninguno
merecedor de desgracia y los tres en peligro constante de destrozar nuestras vidas.
Y por amor, Katherine, por amor. (Salinas, Obras 445).
We have discussed the possible essences of the stone and we see that various forms of
intentionality emerge throughout this poem. We have learned in the introduction that an empty
intention “is an intention that targets something that is not there, something absent, something
not present to the one who intends” (Sokolowski 33). The poetic self continues to intend emptily
the beloved’s absence through the stone’s filled intention. He imagines how the stone carries “la
paciencia del mundo, madurada despacio” (LL 1902). The subject has within his hands the full
intention of the memory of the stone. He hefts its weight and caresses the coarse surface. The
poetic self ponders how this stone came to be. In true phenomenological style, he recalls
memories and intends it. These intentions include the long period of time and the forces of
nature that formed the physical properties of the stone. He understands the large amount of time
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necessary to produce such an entity, but he also realizes his powers of perception are imperfect.
Lines 1903-04 expose his disability upon beholding this “Incalculable suma” of time (1903).
The “incalculable sum” of time the stone hides helps the poetic self to know another
aspect of his being. He gets to know himself better as he reflects upon the stone he holds. He
does this by saying certain terms. Torpe connotes a state of being clumsy or awkward. A stone,
expressed as a personified being, acts clumsily and awkwardly while natural forces dictate what
it can and cannot do. The inanimate object has no choice but to roll along from place to place
bumping and crumbling as it goes. Another meaning attached to torpe has to do with the sense
of understanding. In these cases, normally applied to humans, torpe means slow or dim. The
stone acts as a phenomenological mirror for the poetic self. The handler of the stone also
attributes the third term dura. Like torpe, dura can mean tough, hard, or useless. The adjective
implies another displacement of an unwanted characteristic from the poetic self to the stone.
When all three terms are put together, the poetic self realizes that the beloved’s absence comes
about because of him. This realization becomes quite troublesome to contemplate for the poetic
self. Nevertheless, he affirms this when he states, “que acariciar no sabe y acompaña / tan sólo
con su peso, oscuramente” (1906-07). He humbly sees that he clumsily handles his relationship
with her.
Salinas expresses this same clumsiness in another letter he writes to Katherine. He
compares himself to a stone and writes, “Me preocupo. Me estoy enamorado bárbaramente,
como un niño, con una fuerza fatal, como la de la piedra arrastrada por su peso” (Salinas, Obras
338). He expounds on his clumsiness more in his relationship with his wife. He confesses to
Katherine that he and Margarita had problems. He records:
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Katherine, te voy a decir una cosa con toda mi alma: he vivido muchos años con
M[argarita], hemos pasado juntos momentos muy graves de la vida. Pero nunca
he sentido en el fondo de mi alma ese compañerismo (palabra torpe y corta, pero
no sé otra), ese completarnos, ese hacer juntos. A veces yo me he sentido
superior a ella: otras inferior. ¿No es raro que me sienta yo más íntimo de ti, más
con-viviente, más igual, que con la persona con quien viví tanto? Pues así es, y te
pido me perdones si no he debido decirte esto, si he hecho mal. Pero lo siento,
Katherine. (485, italics in original).
The significance of this confession shows the clumsiness he has towards Katherine and
Margarita. His expectations about what a wife or a lover should entail deal more on
trustworthiness than on sensual gratification, although sensuality plays a part. Intelligence is the
equality Salinas seeks and finds in Katherine. This does not mean Margarita is more or less
intelligent per se, but Salinas does imply that she does not share the same passion with him like
Katherine. Hence Salinas notices this clumsiness and the stone acts as a stumbling block in his
relationships. The consequence Salinas suffers through shows he cannot but see “la otra mujer,
la otra Katherine, […] invisible y presente […] pura y honda de siempre” (286). “Ya ves,
Katherine,” Salinas proclaims, “que estamos iguales, que somos iguales” (317).
The stone gives the poetic self the opportunity to consider the remembered experience
with the beloved. It carries more weight for the poetic self than it does the first time they come
upon it. The memory of the stone invokes the experience again for the poetic self to relive and
behold the beloved in her purity. The poetic self learns many things through the stone. Here the
stone as neglected companion shifts to a vision of the lover’s head when the hands start recalling
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another memory. The facets of the stone satisfy the poetic self and he now contemplates his
hands touching his beloved.
The Hands
The poetic self intends the hands as organs of memory, as part of his body: “También
recuerdan ellas, mis manos, / haber tenido una cabeza amada entre sus palmas” (1924-25). The
stone triggers a memory of the beloved’s head. For the poetic self, he understands the objects of
his memory have not ceased to exist just because they are now absent. Touch helps him to
reconnect with the beloved, to express his will to contemplate the one he loves, and it plays an
important part in the poem. Touch plays a part in any affair between lovers. The intentionality
of the beloved would not be completely filled if the poetic self could not touch her. Touch
creates a bond between the subject and the object into an intertwining consciousness. The
confusion mixes between the entities and the conscious perception of each other “miscarries”
like hands in Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible or in Pedro Salinas’s “Mis ojos ven
en el árbol” (322-23; Poesías 4-5). It also marks the culmination of desire and will, a goal
reached through effort and struggle.
Line 1926 of Largo Lamento highlights touch’s importance: “Nada más misterioso en
este mundo.” Hands perceive objects like eyes do, but in a slower manner. They feel, hold,
caress, and heft objects. They can “remember” the size and texture of the beloved’s head.
Hands may not have the rapid gaze to see horizons like the eyes, but they can intuit an essence
more surely. Their intentions penetrate as far as the object resists them, and without resistance
hands grope frantically to fill those intentions. For the hands, what lies beyond the expanse is
mysterious. They are blind insofar as they perceive best when touching an object. In the poem,
the fingers recognize the hairs of the head “lentamente, uno a uno, como hojas / de calendario”
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(LL 1927-29). Hands communicate with the object and, like any sensory organ, recall past
experiences and relive those moments. Touching gives hands purpose. While the fingers comb
through the strands of hair, the filled intentions:
son recuerdos
de otros tantos, también innumerables
días felices,
dóciles al amor que los revive. (1929-32)
Touch invokes strong memories of intimacy. Hands may be blind and slow, but they are not
paralyzed. They sense pleasure and pain more vividly than most visual intentions.
Nevertheless, hands do need to touch an object in order to perceive it. When they do not
touch something, they are completely blind. Hands have other sides to deal with. “Pero al
palpar la forma inexorable / que detrás de la carne nos resiste / las palmas ya se quedan ciegas”
(1933-35). Hands penetrate the darkness of the unknown like other senses, but not as far. The
hands sense pain and frustration vividly, especially when they reach the limit of their
investigations. Resistance quite often comes to the hands insofar as the object wishes to conceal
a certain attribute. The poetic self describes the hands’ movements in this manner:
No son caricias, no, lo que repiten
pasando y repasando sobre el hueso:
son preguntas sin fin, son infinitas
angustias hechas tactos ardorosos. (1936-39)
Here we see the tension between the hands and the resistance it senses while touching the
beloved’s forehead. Anguish, distress, anxiety, and worry reflect back from the resistance. The
ardent and passionate touch of the poetic self also reflects his constant search to unify with the
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beloved. She bars him from doing so. It is as though thoughts and secrets can present
themselves to the hands as palpable matter. If given complete freedom, they would gladly
penetrate deeper to find clarity within the beloved’s mind.
The hands recall other times of the beloved through other memories. The hands manifest
these memories and the poetic self recalls them when his hand combed the beloved’s hair in
another poem. Like Merleau-Ponty’s concept of a third eye that sees the invisible, a third hand
reaches out to the untouchable.
Mi mano, o una sombra de mi mano,
o acaso ni una sombra,
la memoria, tan sólo, de mi mano
jamás acarició una cabellera
tan lenta y tan profunda
como la de ese sueño que me diste. (1417-21)
The memory of the hand invokes a dream the beloved gives to him. It is another form of
intentionality. The sense of touch briefly intends the moment when he says:
Por ti he cogido a un sueño de las manos.
Por ti mi mano de mortal materia,
ha tocado los dedos
tan trémulos, tan vagos,
como sombras de chopos en el agua,
con los que un sueño roza al mundo
sin que apenas lo sienta
nadie más que la frente consagrada. (1432-39)
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The poetic self’s hands sense the abyss of the beloved’s essence and remarks, “Me lo siento en
las manos, / enormes fosas llenas de su falta” (1501-02). Hands invoke a memory again when
the poetic self tells the beloved the following:
Tú vives siempre en tus actos.
Con la punta de tus dedos
pulsas el mundo, le arrancas
auroras, triunfos, colores,
alegrías: es tu música.
La vida es lo que tú tocas. (Voz 1-6)
The hands participated intimately with the beloved through all stages of the affair. He
depends on the hands to ground himself, stabilize himself to intend the beloved better. His hands
express his will to behold deeply, his desire to know the essence of being, his willingness to be a
being. In turn, the beloved’s touch reciprocates the same essences the poetic self and reaffirms
his position in the perceived world.
In “La memoria en las manos,” the poetic self enters a remembered world in which he
beholds the beloved’s presence. Ironically, if another person were to see him living out this
world, that person might think him delirious. The poetic self talks as though the beloved were
present despite knowing there is no interlocutor. Each poem in Largo Lamento is a place “donde
todo es un contarle a ella; pero fundamentalmente, un contarse, cuando se constata que no hay
interlocutor” (Escartín 18, italics in original). The shifts in semantics relating to the first person
plural imply schizophrenia. 3 This talking-to-oneself exerts an emotion not felt previously in the

3

For further discussion, see “Chapter 4: The Disenchantment of the Eye: Bataille and the Surrealists” in Martin

Jay’s Downcast Eyes, pages 211-62. The condition, shown by the poetic self, supports the antiocularcentric point of
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love affair. The poetic self’s position resembles that of Cézanne behavior in Merleau-Ponty’s
“Cézanne’s Doubt.” Merleau-Ponty states:
This loss of flexible human contact; this inability to master new situations; this
flight into established habits, in an atmosphere which presented no problems; this
rigid opposition between theory and practice, between the “hook” and the
freedom of the recluse—all these symptoms permit one to speak of a morbid
constitution and more precisely, as, for example, in the case of El Greco, of
schizothymia. 4 The notion of painting “from nature” could be said to arise from
the same weakness. His extremely close attention to nature and to color, the
inhuman character of his paintings (he said that a face should be painted as an
object), his devotion to the visible world: all of these would then only represent a
flight from the human world, the alienation of his humanity. (60-61)
The poetic self flees from other human contacts and focuses on his visible world in order to
contact the beloved. Again, like Cézanne, the poetic self’s interaction within his invoked world
“was paradoxical: he was pursuing reality without giving up the sensuous surface, with no other
guide than the immediate impression of nature, […] aiming for reality while denying himself the

view held by twentieth-century philosophers and artists. The tenses in the poem shift from singular to plural and
back again. They also switch from first-person to third-person. The evidence manifest a schizophrenic state of
mind experienced by the poetic self. The surrealists, especially Georges Bataille, accepted conditions like
schizophrenia as a viable avenue of perception superior to, if not more than equal to, the sense of sight touted by
previous ocularcentric philosophers. The poem therefore situates a lover gone mad while becoming blind from the
punishing light of truth. The poetic self longs for a return to shadows expressed in poems mentioned previously.
4

Schizothymia is a condition “resembling schizophrenia but remaining within the bounds of normality.” See

<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=schizothymia>.
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means to attain it” (63). The poetic self ignores reality while pursuing it and his gaze searches
for the beloved while his hands caress continuously in search for answers.
In the poem, the hands heft a stone that then recalls a memory the poetic self supporting
the beloved’s head. In his memory the hands sense a surrender of the head. He exclaims, “La
cabeza se entrega,” but he asks, “¿Es la entrega absoluta?” (LL 1944). The hands cannot know if
the beloved submits to his examination. The poetic self concludes about the hands’ effort to
intend the other sides of the beloved’s head or will:
Y nada les contesta: una sospecha
de que todo se escapa y se nos huye
cuando entre nuestras manos lo oprimimos
nos sube del calor de aquella frente. (1940-43)
The hands do not know if the head between their palms answers their inquiry. They continue to
hope and uncover an insight hidden from their perception. The subject keeps searching for the
answer: “El peso en nuestras manos lo insinúa, / los dedos se lo creen, / y quieren convencerse:
palpan, palpan” (LL 1945-47). The hands perceive the full intention of the weight of the head.
Although blind, the hands can figure if the beloved fainted or succumbed to pleasure. The
information they seek lies hidden. The fingers believe one thing, but the hands can only desire to
be convinced. The hands “palpan, palpan” hoping to gain access (1947). The resistance of the
bone impedes the hands’ investigation. Therefore, the hands must be satisfied with whatever lies
beyond the flesh and bone. This decision becomes a paradox. We can only possess when we
have constant contact with the object. Yet if the object is a living being, then our constant
contact can smother what we possess because we do not allow it to choose for itself.
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Salinas experiences this same anxiety when Katherine fades away from his sight. During
the period in their affair, he longs for the secrets enclosed within Katherine’s forehead. He
writes, “Y todo, todo, porvenir, presente, vida, vernos, no vernos, vivir, no vivir, está detrás de
esa frente tuya, en esos labios tuyos, y yo no puedo otra cosa que esperar de ellos mi destino, que
ya escapó de mi voluntad, mi destino próximo —1933— y mi destino total —toda la vida—”
(Salinas, Obras 322-23). The poetic self desires reciprocation, desires to be “realidad” for the
beloved (296). He remembers the head in his hands and longs for her memories of him within
her forehead to reach the hands. The hands come close to touching the essence held within them,
but without reciprocation they remain blind. Without submission, they cannot know.
The hand’s actions seem to elicit a mixture of admiration, jealousy, and love as they
search for the absolute submission of the beloved. Nevertheless, the poetic self justifies the
motives of the hands “Cuya fe única / está en ser buenas, en hacer caricias / sin cansarse,” (LL
1962-64). The exalting purpose of the hands is to continuously touch the objects of their desire.
This affords them a non-exhaustive reason to behold the presence of another self, another entity
capable of reciprocation. Any continuous empty intention denies the hands the object of their
affection.
For the hands, to perceive the beloved guarantees a meaningful existence. When hands
grope aimlessly, they risk not fulfilling desires. The hands’ desire to be good costs them their
purpose. Hence, the hands caress “por ver si así se ganan / cuando ya la cabeza amada vuelva / a
vivir otra vez sobre sus hombros,” (1964-66). The hands exert faith that the beloved’s head will
regain consciousness “y parezca que nada les queda entre las palmas, / el triunfo de no estar
nunca vacías” (1967-68). The act of letting go signifies the poetic self’s faith in sacrificing the
possession of the beloved despite risking never to intend the beloved through touch again.
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The poetic self recalls a filled intention in his memory, but it is not one he expects. The
intention accompanies a voice:
Pero una voz oscura tras la frente,
—¿nuestra frente o la suya?—
nos dice que el misterio más lejano,
porque está allí tan cerca, no se toca
con la carne mortal con que buscamos
allí, en la punta de los dedos,
la presencia invisible. (1948-54)
The invisible presence culminates as part of the essence which the subject beholds. The inner
dialogue teaches the poetic self that his vision of the invisible may not be the same as the
beloved’s vision of him. He forgets momentarily that his object, his beloved, also perceives him
and acts as a subject. His job is only to reveal the invisible beloved in poetic form. The voice is
a presence that asserts the beloved’s will and sovereignty. The voice, ambiguous in its source,
reiterates a truth that applies to any participant’s role in the love triangle. The voice belongs to
the poetic self, the unmentioned person, and the lover all at once.
The voice is a point of discussion needing elaboration. Jean-Paul Sartre teaches about the
relation between the subject and the Other. He makes an analogy using people he sees on the
street in order to explain this relationship. The role of the Other in this relationship is
“conjectural.” According to Sartre, he says the following:
Now it is not only conjectural but probable that this voice which I hear is that of a
man and not a song or a phonograph; it is infinitely probable that the passerby
whom I see is a man and not a perfected robot. This means that without going
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beyond the limits of probability and indeed because of this very probability, my
apprehension of the Other as an object essentially refers me to a fundamental
apprehension of the Other in which he will not be revealed to me as an object but
as a “presence in person.” In short, if the Other is to be a probable object and not
a dream on an object, then his object-ness must of necessity refer not to an
original solitude beyond my reach, but to a fundamental connection in which the
Other is manifested in some way other than through the knowledge which I have
of him. (253, italics in original)
This apprehension is what the subject experiences. The beloved transcends her being as “la
presencia invisible” (LL 1954). She is more than what the hands can perceive or control. The
beloved’s invisible presence helps her ability to incorporate her freedom into her being. This
fundamental characteristic trumps any desire for possession to take effect, unless the beloved
chooses to submit to the poetic self. The hands in memory continue to caress quixotically, to
feel presence of the beloved completely. The poetic self states, “Entre unas manos ciegas / que
no pueden saber” (LL 1961-62). Despite the voice’s admonition, the poetic self stays in his
remembered world and relives the moment he caresses his beloved in infinite bliss.
“La memoria en las manos” shows a poetic self who relives an experience and intends the
presence of the beloved through memory. The presences of the beloved in his memory are real
existences according to Merleau-Ponty. This world the poetic self creates enables him to come
in contact with the beloved despite her absence. The hands form part of the body that contains
memories of the beloved through touch. With these hands, the poetic self remembers a stone
which invokes numerous references to other memories and poetic references. An unassuming
stone can conjure up images of essences of the various fruits and of the beloved. The hands also
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remember the beloved’s head in a moment of ecstasy. They only want to behold the beloved
eternally in a constant presence through touch. They also want to touch the essence and
memories that incorporate the poetic self as an object of the beloved. The essence of the beloved
appears through objects of nature. Whatever the poetic self sees in nature, he sees his beloved.
All objects and intentions point to the poetic self’s center and essence. The beloved is his world.
In the following chapter, we will see how Pedro Salinas intends nature through his
correspondence with his wife. He takes the opportunity to explain his theory of tourism and
practices it while beholding natural parks and landscapes in his trip to a literary conference in
Los Angeles, California. These natural appearances also invoke poetic references to literary
sources and to his native Spain. Salinas consistently sees the purity or brute essence emanating
from the natural features and all of them reveal an essence belonging to his beloved, whether it is
Margarita or Katherine. All images point back to the center of his world.
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Chapter 3: Pedro Salinas’s Theory of Tourism
Pedro Salinas exerts a spiritual force in his poetry. His themes deal with the beloved’s
presence or absence, essences, and the poetic self’s perception of scenery. He also deals with
spatiality and how the one can commune with another despite long distances. Salinas
corresponds prolifically to his many friends and family members over his lifetime. In his letters,
he writes unpretentiously about his feelings towards people, places, ideas, and art. Readers may
get the impression that they are intruding on a private conversation in which they hear only
Salinas’s side. Salinas never means to publish or publicize his intimate letters to anyone outside
his circle of friends, family, or lover although he may have suspected they would come to light
one day. Thanks to his daughter and son-in-law, as well as to dedicated critics, we have the
privilege of knowing a more personal side of Salinas. For us, we can commune with a poetic
friend as we learn his likes, dislikes, and points of view. We see how Salinas intends objects in
nature deeply. This chapter will focus on Salinas’s contemplations of nature during a trip to a
literary conference in Los Angeles, California. He especially takes notice of landscapes located
in Utah. Salinas sees these natural landscapes and records his impressions in writing. Salinas
paints his landscapes with poetic language. He then dedicates all his observations to his wife
Margarita Bonmatí. As for Katherine Whitmore, she takes second place for a time, but does not
forget her.
Salinas certainly has a heightened sense of observation during his adolescence and young
adulthood. He grows up into a responsible and intelligent professor of literature, studying in his
hometown of Madrid and in Paris, France. He teaches in various places including Spain, France,
and Great Britain. When he is not teaching or studying, he writes letters and poems to Margarita

63

Bonmatí, a young woman living on the shores near Algiers, Algeria 1 at the time. They court for
some years before eventually marrying each other on December 29, 1915 (Bou 27, footnote 1).
Before and during their marriage, Salinas describes to Margarita in great detail objects in nature.
He dedicates these filled intentions he has to her. He writes about his desire to visit certain
places, and in one letter he writes, “Hace muchísimo tiempo que espero una ocasión favorable
para ir a América, país por el que siento una vivísima curiosidad y simpatía” (“It has been a long
time since I have waited for an occasion to go to America, a country that which I feel a vivacious
curiosity and affinity”) (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 59). 2 In the 1930s, he meets Katherine
Whitmore and pursues her as his paramour. She becomes the catalyst he needs to write about the
beloved in La voz a ti debida (The Voice I Owe to You), Razón de Amor (A Reason for Love), and
Largo Lamento (Long Lament). He works as a public official in the education system of the
Second Republic. When the political climate begins to sour, he writes to Katherine the following:
La solución ideal sería irme al extranjero: eso es el modo de romper más natural.
¿Pero dónde y cómo? Lo que me dices de América, alma, es un sueño. ¡Si
pudiera ser! Aceptaría cualquier cosa, cualesquiera condiciones, con tal de estar
en la misma tierra que tú.
The ideal solution for me would be to leave to other countries: that is the most
natural way to break off. But where and how? I would accept anything, any
1

“Pedro Salinas y su novia, Margarita Bonmatí,” writes Solita Salinas de Marichal, “estuvieron separados durante

los tres años de su noviazgo. Ella vivía en Argelia, él en Madrid, y sólo se veían durante un mes al año, en Santa
Pola, un pueblecito de Alicante” (“Pedro Salinas and his girlfriend, Margarita Bonmatí, were separated during the
three years of their courtship. She was living in Algeria, he in Madrid, and they only saw each other for a month
each year, in Santa Pola, a village in Alicante”) (“Presentación” 11).
2

All translations, except where indicated, are my own and attempt to help readers who do not know Spanish.
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conditions, so long as to be in the same land as you. (Salinas, Obras 483,
emphasis in original).
However, fortune smiles upon Salinas and he finds a way to come to the United States. He gets
the opportunity while applying for a job located in Massachusetts, and when the Spanish Civil
War is about the break out, he accepts the position at Wellesley and makes plans to leave Spain.
The curiosity Salinas has while traveling is insatiable. Wherever he goes he intends each
mountain, valley, seashore, or forest in its transcendence. He dedicates visions and poetry to two
women in his life. He writes Margarita a letter stating “Realmente, vida, la poesía es tuya: así
que yo no he hecho más que escribirla” (“In fact, darling, poetry is yours: so I have done nothing
but write it down”) (Cartas de amor 75). He also dedicates poetry to Katherine saying, “Solo
versos escribo. ¿Por qué? Porque se escriben pronto, porque se escriben corriendo, en un
momento. Y porque me los manda, me los ordena, una fuerza superior e irresistible, porque
vienen de mi Katherine, son de ella, por ella, y para ella, como todo lo de su PEDRO” (“I write
only verses. Why? Because they are written soon, they are written running, in a moment. And
because a superior and irresistible force commands me, orders me, to write them, because they
come from my Katherine, they are of her, by her and for her, like everything from her PEDRO”)
(Obras 336). Margarita and Katherine blend to become his poetic center. The fusion has not
been without contention, but by the late 1930s and early 1940s, the romantic drama has begun to
settle down. Katherine communicates with Salinas through limited correspondence, and by 1940
letters become scarce. On the other hand, letters to Margarita flow generously when Salinas
travels about America.
Salinas travels so extensively he begins to reduce tourism down to a science. He visits
places and recounts to his wife moments in letters making sure to fill her in with his thoughts
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about her. On Saturday, June 17, 1939, he writes a letter while on a trip through Arizona and
other points of interest. The following quote is quite long, but indispensable in understanding his
joie de vivre as well as his developing theory of tourism. Notice how profound and thoughtful
he is about his perception.
Otro día estupendo. Estaba cansadísimo, anoche, me pasé diez horas en
la cama y me he levantado al pelo. Y en seguida, a lo mismo, a ver, y a ver. Por
la mañana un recorrido en autocar, parándose en los mejores puntos de vista. Y
ahora, después de comer, dejaré el rebaño turístico y me iré yo solito, a pasear, a
tomar el sol, y a mirar. Sabes, he descubierto que el turismo tiene tres grados, de
menos a más. El primero, y elemental, es ver. La mayoría de los turistas ven,
nada más. Ven lo que les enseñan, sin voluntad, porque se lo ponen delante, sin
escoger ni diferenciar. El segundo grado es mirar: ya en mirar hay elección, y
más actividad; se mira lo que uno prefiere e implica cierta personalidad e
iniciativa. El turista decente ve todo, pero escoge y sólo mira a ciertas cosas. Y
se llega al tercer grado: contemplar. Eso es lo supremo: una vez escogido lo que
nos llama más la atención al corazón, se lo contempla es decir se fija la vista en
ello, se pone en la vista la voluntad de penetrarlo con el alma, y así va uno
apoderándose de ello. Es el grado supremo, porque al llegar a él el turismo
queda abolido: ya no se anda, no nos movemos. Plus de tours! El verdadero
turismo conduce a la contemplación, ¿no te parece? A pararse, a no andar más.
¡Jardines de Granada!
Ya ves cómo estoy desarrollando una teoría nueva del turismo. ¿Te gusta?
Es un tanto mística, me parece. Pero ellos tenían razón en que la forma superior
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de conocimiento es la contemplación, no la acción. La posesión por la
contemplación es mucho más pura. La posesión por la acción, empieza en la
fiera. Adiós, guapa. Ves que estoy animado. Salgo esta tarde y mañana en Los
Ángeles. ¿Estarás tú allí haciendo de ángel suplementario?
Another great day. I was very tired, last night, I spent ten hours in bed and
I got out of bed feeling great. And straight away, the same, seeing, and seeing. In
the morning a trip by coach, stopping at the best viewpoints. And now, after
eating, I will abandon the tourist herd and leave all by myself, to go for a walk, to
take in the sun, and to look. You know, I have discovered that tourism has three
degrees, from least to greatest. The first, and elementary, is seeing. The majority
of tourists see, nothing more. They see what is shown them, without will, because
they are placed before it, without choosing or differentiating. The second degree
is looking: now in looking there is a choice, and more activity; the thing looked at
is what one prefers and it implies a certain personality and initiative. The decent
tourist sees everything, but chooses and only looks at certain things. And then
comes the third degree: contemplating. That is the supreme: once chosen what
best calls attention to our heart, we contemplate it that is to say the view is fixed
on it, the will to penetrate it with the soul is placed in the view, and so one
becomes overpowered by the thing. It is the supreme degree, because upon
arriving to the person tourism is left abolished: now walking stops, we do not
move. Plus de tours! Real tourism leads to contemplation, don’t you think? To
stop, to no longer move. Gardens of Granada!
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Now you see how I am developing a new theory of tourism. Do you like
it? It’s a bit mystical, it seems to me. But they are right in that the higher form of
knowledge is contemplation, not action. Possession because of contemplation is
far more pure. Possession because of action, it starts in the brute. Goodbye, doll.
You see how I am in high spirits. I leave this afternoon and in the morning Los
Angeles. Will you be there playing the additional angel? (Salinas, Cartas de
viaje 109, emphasis in original)
Salinas shows how open and personal he is with his thoughts and with his love. His
personal theory of tourism parallels intentionality quite nicely. His first degree of tourism,
seeing, satisfies the basic concept of filled intentions. The subject simply allows some things to
appear while disregarding other objects. The second degree, looking, corresponds to intending
the object’s sides, aspects, and profiles. The subject exerts more energy by physically moving
the object or moving him or herself, literally or imaginatively, to intend the different sides of the
object. Intuition fits closely with this concept. The subject intuits the object and recognizes its
properties. The third degree, contemplating, is the key to intend truly the object in its essence. It
takes time to contemplate upon what one sees, and Salinas practices this faithfully.
A critic notes Salinas’s type of contemplation as follows: “Contemplar: trascender la
apariencia, hasta tocar con las manos, estremecidas por el cansancio de la vida, «el alma de las
cosas»” (“Contemplate: to transcend appearance, until touching with the hands, trembling
because of the weariness of life, ‘the soul of things’”) (Vila 65). Contemplation is an action in
which the subject intends with his body the object of his vision. Contemplation is one
characteristic the poetic self encourages his beloved to do throughout the three collections of
poetry. Salinas observes the behavior of other tourists as only fulfilling the first degree of
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tourism, merely seeing. The introspection one gains from it reveals not just the essence of the
object, but also the essence of oneself. A psychological mirror reflects the aspirations and
qualities of the subject inducing a desire to see ordinary objects in a new light or changing an
attribute of one’s character. When done properly, contemplation helps the beholder gain much
more than just an appearance. For Salinas, many things he sees while he travels point back to his
poetic center. Whether Margarita or Katherine is a filled intention in the form of a memory, a
letter, or a photo—or an empty intention by way of distance—it does not matter to him. He
communes with either of them in any place and at any time. She is one with him when he
remembers her, for the memories he brings about her fill him with a perception based on
experience. 3
In the next few sections, we will see how Salinas contemplates natural scenery during a
trip he makes in 1940. As usual, he writes to Margarita and to his children from time to time.
Salinas plans to attend a literary conference in Los Angeles, California, but on the way he takes a
peripatetic opportunity and schedules plenty of time to sightsee for a week before the conference
convenes. The historical background that allows Salinas to take his trip at this time will
intersperse these sections as well.

3

For purposes of this essay, we need to note that Salinas’s poetic center revolves around Margarita more than

around Katherine. As we focus on a particular year, Salinas writes a letter to Katherine on Monday, December 10,
1939 before he travels through western states roughly nine months later (Salinas, Obras 798-802). He writes her
again in December 1940, but this letter is unusually short and wishes her a happy holiday season (865-66). The tone
implies that Katherine has cut off most contacts with Salinas for quite some time. Therefore, Margarita assumes a
larger role as his poetic center during this time period.
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St. Louis, Missouri
Salinas writes his first letter to Margarita in Saint Louis. It is Saturday, August 3, 1940,
and while waiting for his train connection he takes the opportunity to jot down his observations.
He spends considerable time discussing how he sees light and water interact. Water acts like
light emitting its own shine while light acts like flowing water of “pura esencia” (“pure essence”)
(Salinas, Cartas de viaje 141-42). Yet he states, “Sobre todo, no pude contemplarlo” (“Above
all, I was unable to contemplate it.”) (142, emphasis in original). He reaches an intuition about
how both forces behave and react to each other. Time may have impeded him to reach the
contemplative stage. Nevertheless, the appearance reminds him of previous experiences with
Niagara Falls and the Grand Canyon. Through memory he revisits these places and reaches the
third stage of tourism when he contemplates these famous places. He writes, “No obstante,
ahora el Niágara, como el año pasado el Grand Canyon, me dan las dos sensaciones de
naturaleza más grandes y majestuosas. En este país de lo nice, de lo sweet, de lo bonito, sólo
estas dos maravillas compensan de tanta dulzarronería” (“However, now the Niagara, like the
Grand Canyon the year before, the two give me the most great and majestic sensations of nature.
In this country of the nice, of the sweet, of the lovely, only these two wonders make up for so
much saccharinity”) (142, emphasis in original).
Privacy also is an obstacle to contemplate his surroundings. Salinas notices a difference
between Niagara Falls and the Grand Canyon. Niagara Falls is more easily accessible to
residents of the east coast of the United States than the Grand Canyon near the west coast. Yet
the western United States has more national parks with lots of space in between and fewer people.
An introverted and introspective person like Salinas would have a difficult time meditating with
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scores of tourists around. Salinas does condescend a bit when he observes tourists constantly
seeing and never contemplating. He vents his frustrations writing the following:
¡Pero qué público! La diferencia con el Grand Canyon es que allí se puede uno
aislar para la visión y la contemplación, en cualquier sitio del monte, porque el
cañón se ve desde todas partes. Pero aquí, sólo hay unos cuantos puntos de vista
y la gente se amontona, chilla, se mueve, y saca fotos, y fotos, sin parar. En mi
vida he visto más máquinas fotográficas. ¿Cómo se podría arreglar eso?
¿Democracia, nazismo? Siempre turba, plebe. Es un sueño, ver el Niágara solo,
en silencio. Sueño imposible.
But what an audience! The difference with the Grand Canyon is that over there
one can isolate for vision and contemplation, in any place on the mount, because
the canyon is seen from all parts. But here, there are only a few scenic outlooks
and the people crowd together, shout, move, and take pictures, and pictures,
without stopping. In my life I have seen more cameras. How could we fix that?
Democracy, Nazism? Always mobs, masses. It’s a dream, to see the Niagara
alone, in silence. Impossible dream. (142)
Salinas does not have anything against photography per se, but how tourists experience settings
through their cameras: “Ya sabes que me gusta la fotografía” (“You already know that I like
photography”) (Obras 324). Salinas wishes that tourists in general should slow down and think
about what they see. They miss the point when they intend objects superficially, take pictures,
and move on to the next sight repeating the same thing. Tourists who frame scenery through a
viewfinder in a camera intend the place differently than others who do not. Effectively, the
camera distances the subject from the object further through an artificial lens and packages a
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portion of the landscape into a small, deformed, rectangular surface. Later, a tourist develops the
picture and marvels over intending the pictorial representation more than the visceral experience
he or she had. Years later, the same picture presents a different appearance to the tourists
involved, and they wonder why they took the picture in the first place. One should intend the
object purely, without filters. Salinas longs to perceive the object in its entirety, or in its pure
state, filled and empty intentions alike. Salinas employs all of his senses and goes beyond them
to probe the essences of the surrounding world. He experiences events. He senses the object and
searches for latent possibilities of the object he wants to understand. Being alone gives him the
time to reflect, to behold intensely. The interruptions of tourists, their sounds and their
squabbling, detract from this meditation. If Salinas gets a chance to avoid tourists, he takes the
opportunity to leave the group and finds a way to commune with the landscape in silence. In the
case of Niagara Falls, it is an empty intention, but one that has been filled before. He intends
Niagara Falls in its absence, in its reflective state. He also intends Niagara Falls in an
imaginative state, creating a space where he beholds it without distractions. He admits though
that such a desire may never come true because of its popularity with the masses; hence he
laments saying, “Sueño imposible,” (“Impossible dream,”) and closes his letter (Cartas de viaje
142).
Manitou Springs, Colorado
He writes his next letter to Margarita while staying at the Hotel Grand View in Manitou
Springs, Colorado. He is near Pikes Peak and plans to go to the summit the next day because he
misses the tour bus. The tardiness of the train does not faze him. In fact, he recounts the
sensations he feels during the trip while seeing the prairie landscape and he allows the land to
recall his native land. “Happy and sad at the same time,” writes Newman, “Salinas hovered in
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that delicate balance between prospect and retrospect […]. Spain was superimposing itself on
America, […] the lands seemed to remember their Spanish origins” (177).
One of the most unfortunate moments Salinas has to face is becoming an exile from his
native country. During the years preceding the Spanish Civil War, Salinas sees the political
complications playing out between the right and the left. Although sympathetic to the Second
Republic, he understands the gravity of the situation and prepares his family to leave Spain.
Luckily, he corresponds with an Alice Bushee of Wellesley College and obtains employment as
a distinguished visiting professor (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 59-61). Enric Bou relates in a
footnote that Salinas, “Tuvo dificultades para encontrar un medio de abandonar España por mar,
puesto que la frontera terrestre estaba cerrada. Por fin surgió la posibilidad de salir en un barco
de guerra norteamericano, el ‘Cayuga’” (“He ran into obstacles to locate means to abandon Spain
by sea, since the border by land was closed. At last the possibility of leaving emerged in a North
American warship, the ‘Cayuga’”) (62). 4 He embarks and makes his way to Wellesley,
Massachusetts to teach Spanish literature to young women.
As an exile, Salinas reminisces from time to time about certain parts of Spain on the train
ride he just had. On the train, he spends hours contemplating the landscape of Kansas. He
remarks to Margarita in his letter how the landscape appears like “un paisaje castellano, sí.
¿Valladolid?” (“a Castilian landscape, yes. Valladolid?”) (Cartas de viaje 142). Salinas may
4

See footnote 66 to read about Salinas’s experience before embarking. Because of the suspicion towards artists and

literary critics, the military personnel inspecting his luggage find a copy of one of his plays. The probability of
getting arrested gets intense until a sailor says, in effect, that the boat is ready to sail. Salinas then leaves Spain on
August 31, 1936, never to return. His wife and children do not accompany him, but leave for Maison Carrée (now
El Harrach), Algeria to wait and find another way to leave the Old World. By the time Salinas takes this trip, he and
his family have already reunited and are living in Massachusetts.
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have thought about Katherine for a moment, his “Gran Duquesa de Kansas” (“Grand Duchess of
Kansas”) (Obras 373). 5 Other times, he thinks of “Burgos, tierra parda y gris, apenas ondulada y
montañas azuleantes, al fondo” (“Burgos, brown and gray land, scarcely undulating and bluish
mountains, in the background”) (142). Then he sees another essence of what makes Castile the
way it is compared to its sister in America. Salinas writes:
Pero sólo la tierra es como Castilla. ¡Cómo se echan de menos aquellos pueblos,
con la torre de la iglesia, a veces con el castillo! Son el alma de la tierra, ahora
lo siento. Y ésta es una Castilla que no puede engañar, sin alma, sin iglesias, sin
castillos. Paisaje sin historia, simplemente pobre. Apenas poblado, muy de lejos
en lejos hay unas casuchas de madera, sucias, como de gitanos. Y por los
caminos, blancos como los castellanos, el eterno auto, la marca de América. Si
con los ojos veía al aparecer Kansas, datos reales, tierra semejante, pero el alma
no se equivocó. Parece una tontería, pero ciertos paisajes necesitan historia. No
los verdes, que parecen jóvenes siempre, y por eso sin historia. Pero sí los otros.
Hoy he comprendido cómo Castilla es mucho más que pobre: por su historia. Y
no es que se la conozca o sepa, no. Es que está allí, ya dentro, hecha una con lo
terreno, en cruce eterno con el Espíritu, no literatura.
But only the land is like Castile. How one misses those villages, with the church
spire, sometimes with the castle! They are the soul of the earth, now I feel it.
And this is a Castile that does not deceive, without soul, without churches,
5

The comparison of Kansas with Castile recalls a letter Salinas writes to Katherine during a train trip on December

14, 1932: “¡Qué gris, qué parda, qué austera Castilla, esta que voy atravesando, mientras te escribo! […] Y toda
Castilla parece estar poblada por esqueletos en pie” (“How gray, how dun, how austere Castile, this that I go
crossing, while I write you! […] And all Castile seems to be filled with standing skeletons”) (Obras 345).
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without castles. A landscape without history, simply poor. Hardly settled, very
few and far in between there are some wooden hovels, dirty, like those of Gypsies.
And through the routes, white like the Castilians, the eternal car, the mark of
America. If the eyes could see Kansas upon showing up, real facts, similar land,
but the soul was not wrong. It seems a silly thing, but certain landscapes need
history. Not the green ones, that appear always young, and therefore without
history. But the others do. Today I have comprehended how Castile is much
more than poor: by its history. And it is not that it is recognized or known, no. It
is because it is there, already within, made one with the terrain, in eternal crossing
with the Spirit, not literature. (142-43, emphasis in original)
Salinas lets the landscape recall memories of Spain within him. He relives experiences
and reflects upon them within the new reflection of the American plains. He notices how rich in
history the poor terrain of Castile is. The memories he reenacts within his soul cause him
consciously to have empty intentions of the churches, castles, and houses he used to see. Not
only that, but the reflection also awakens a memory about his relationship with Katherine. He,
like the Castilian terrain, needs a history, which he does carry from Spain to the United States. It
is already within him, “en cruce eterno con el Espíritu, no literatura” (“in eternal crossing with
the Spirit, not literature.”) (143). Like the artist who paints with his hands and not his mind, the
poet writes with his hands what he has in mind (Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind” 57).
Salinas mentions in his letter that despite the train’s tardiness to arrive in Colorado on
time, he tells how “el viaje en tren ha sido muy curioso” (“the train trip has been very curious”)
(Salinas, Cartas de viaje 142). He describes the characteristics of the vehicle as “Tren bueno,
cómodo y fresco, coche salón, sin gente” (“Good train, comfortable and fresh, lounge car,
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without people”) (142). When he mentions “coche salón,” (“lounge car,”) he may be referring to
the one shown in fig. 1. This lounge car gives travelers a complete panoramic view of the
countryside. With the benefit of few people on board the train, Salinas would certainly take
advantage of the “silencio” (“silence”) necessary to contemplate the American/Spanish
landscape. The Utah Parks Company offered these lounge cars as a way to pamper their guests
while they made their way to destinations. The lounge car transports the exiled poet from one
place to another while he contemplates the significations before him, around him, and in him
during his journey.

Fig. 1. Lounge car, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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Salinas ends his letter with anticipatory empty intentions of his next stops. He writes,
“Estoy deseando llegar a Cedar City para tener carta tuya” (“I can’t wait to arrive at Cedar City
to have your letter”) (143). Salinas, more than anything, intends the beloved within the
appearances he perceives during his journeys. He communes with his Margarita/Katherine
through memories, intentions, and significations. They encapsulate the essence of Salinas’s
intentionality. He speaks only to his essence because he says, “Ya estoy bien, contento. Me
gusta no hablar con nadie, y no me encuentro mal por eso. Descanso de tanto hablar […]”
(“Now I am fine, content. I like not talking to anyone, and I do not feel ill because of it. I rest
from so much talking […]”) (143). At last, through a mixture of imagination and experience,
Salinas signs off writing, “Te abrazo, Marg mía, en el recuerdo” (“I embrace you, my Marg, in
the recollection”) (143). He sends the letter hoping his upcoming empty intention of an answer
will become another presence of memory of his beloved.
Cedar City, Utah
Two days later, he writes another letter to Margarita describing new intentions of nature
in his travels. He does not find a letter like he hopes, but he faithfully writes anyway. “Se
amontonan tanto las impresiones, Margarita mía, que no sé si te las puedo contar todas” (“The
impressions pile up so much, my Margarita, that I do not know if I can tell them all to you”)
(143). He visits Pikes Peak like he promises in his previous letter. On this day, the panoramic
view from Pikes Peak reveals a blanket of clouds. For a normal tourist, this would be a disaster
of sorts. Tourists from America would feel especially cheated because “America the
Beautiful”—the famous, patriotic song written by Katharine Lee Bates—describes the land’s
features from the author’s point of view from the summit. Salinas may not have understood the
disappointment they feel, but he writes what they say, “Y aún había gente que decía ‘¡Lástima
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que haya estado nublado! ¡No hemos visto nada!’ Echaban de menos el plano” (“And still there
were people saying, ‘What a pity that it was overcast! We haven’t seen anything.’ They missed
the map”) (143, emphasis in original). Nevertheless, despite cloudy conditions, Salinas ventures
to find his own experience and not that of another. He contemplates the clouds willingly.
On the way up to the summit, Salinas relates to Margarita in his letter that “Una niña que
venía en el auto dijo, ‘Mamá, ¡cuánto humo!’” (“A girl that came in the car said, ‘Mommy, there
is so much smoke’”) (143). The girl, of course, is referring to the clouds as if they were smoke.
Salina’s observation of the girl’s mistake has significance in that when it comes to seeing
essences, children see better than adults, even if, and especially because, they blur the things they
see. He does not observe the girl’s observation as a mistake. He notices the moment because
she immediately and unconsciously sees the clouds like smoke from a previous experience or
from memory. She confuses smoke and clouds as one substance in an interconnected
relationship in the girl’s universe. The signifier she gives the smoke/clouds outside the vehicle
connotes another world as existing concurrently with the one Salinas perceives. The girl and
Salinas share this world almost immediately and the objects they intend reveal new essences
from these new appearances. Adults have difficulty seeing beyond the appearance of things
because they have grown up delineating objects from one another. Children however see objects
as interconnected substances. They see each object comes from one entity. Salinas captures this
spirit in an earlier poem while still residing in Spain. He hears about a child that names her
father, mother, and a mountain with the same name and writes:
«Todo lo confunde», dijo
su madre. Y era verdad.
Porque cuando yo la oía
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decir «Tatá, dadá»,
veía la bola del mundo
rodar, rodar,
el mundo todo una bola,
y en ella papá, mamá,
el mar, las montañas, todo
hecho una bola confusa;
el mundo «Tatá, dadá».
“She confuses everything,” said
her mother. And it was true.
Because when I heard her
say “Tatá, dadá,”
I saw the ball of the world
roll on, roll on,
the whole world a ball
and on it papá, mamá,
the sea, the mountains, all
done into a confused ball
the world “Tatá, dadá.” (Salinas, Poesías 5-6)
Salinas, as well as the poetic self in the poems we have discussed in this work, relearns how to
see like a child. He sees the world, the ball, the fruit, the mother, the father as one.
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He continues describing the clouds of Pikes Peak as though he were ascending the
summit of Mount Olympus and panning the domain of Zeus above the golden clouds. Salinas
takes the entire view in and writes:
Fue un camino a las nubes. Conforme ascendíamos, nos aproximábamos más a
unos vapores difusos. […] Llegamos hasta ellas y por fin en la cumbre, nos
vimos por encima de ellas. […] Miré, miré, miré. Encima un cielo azul, sol vivo.
Debajo las nubes, variando de matices, sugiriendo formas. Y nada más: lo otro,
la tierra, era una sospecha, un recuerdo, sin nada que lo probase. […] Al
descender, muy cerca de la cima hay un recodo del camino donde se asoma uno a
una especie de mirador: allí las rocas forman una rinconada, semejante a un
pozo. ¿Y qué se ve? Nubes. Es un pozo de nubes, así lo bauticé yo, en mi
interior. Se me venía a la memoria el verso, mejor dicho la frase, de Bécquer:
“Huésped de las nieblas.” Fue maravilloso, eso de pasar por todos los niveles de
las nubes.
It was a path to the clouds. As soon as we were ascending, we were coming
closer to more diffuse vapors. […] We arrived up to them and finally at the
summit, we found ourselves above them. […] I looked, looked, looked. On top a
blue sky, burning sun. Below the clouds, giving some variety to nuances, hinting
at forms. And nothing more: the other, the earth, was a suspicion, a memory,
without anything to prove it. Upon descending, very close to the peak there is a
nook in the path where one looks out from a sort of viewing point: over there the
rocks form a corner, like that of a well. And what can one see? Clouds. It is a
well of clouds, thus I named it, deep down. A verse came to me in my memory,
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or rather a phrase, by Bécquer: “Host of mists.” It was marvelous, all that passing
through all levels of the clouds. (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 143, emphasis in
original)
Salinas reaches only his second level which is to look at the sights. He could reach the
level on contemplation if he had more time to stay at each destination. Hence, he “looks, looks,
looks” at the clouds, their subtle forms and emptily intends the hidden land beneath them.
Memories and experiences from his studies recall other poets and their works. The impressions
come to him plentifully and he concludes, “Ojalá lea algo algún día, en eso que ayer vi” (“I hope
to read something someday, in what I saw yesterday”) (143). He ponders on linguistic
difficulties in describing what he sees and remarks the following to his beloved Margarita:
Porque me ocurre con muchas de las cosas que veo que se me representa en ellas
un a modo de conjunto de signos supremos, absolutos que no sé leer ni traducir
en el sistema de signos relativos que llamamos palabras. Esas cosas inmensas
me dicen algo, sí, pero no se me formula en la conciencia su mensaje,
comprendes, de modo organizado y comunicable. Espero. Quizás algún día vea
lo que ayer miré, hecho forma expresiva. Entretanto, o para siempre, a ti sola
van estas señas de lo visto.
Because it occurs to me that many of the things that I see that are represented in
them are a manner overall of supreme signs, absolutes that I know not how to read
or translate in the system of relative signs we call words. Those vast things say
something to me, yes, but they don’t formulate their message in my consciousness,
you understand, in an organized and communicable way. I wish. Maybe
someday I will see what I looked at yesterday, made into expressive form. In the
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meantime, or forever, these signs of the seen go to you alone. (143-44, emphasis
in original)
The linguistic obstacle he faces as a poet tries him endlessly. As a person probing the essence of
objects, sometimes the task becomes impossible when he tries to formulate descriptions of
essence into limited vocabulary. His quest for capturing this essence, like every other poet’s,
almost becomes impossible. Nevertheless, he succeeds as a poet who reaches the closest to
portraying essence to his readers. He may intend differently than a reader, but both intentions
point to the same entity. The first intends it as past experience while the second intends it as
anticipatory future. Author and reader, at least, have the possibility to have the empty intentions
filled again or for the first time. In his letter, Salinas intends emptily what he just sees, while his
wife will read the letter and intend the same entities emptily as a person who imagines their
forms in anticipation for future experience. Both join together in soul like the poetic self in a
poem he writes for Katherine: “Que hay otro ser por el que miro el mundo / porque me está
queriendo con sus ojos” (“For there is another being through whom I look at the world / because
she is loving me with her eyes”) (Voz 808-09; Crispin 39).
Salinas travels again the next day to Salt Lake City, Utah. He takes advantage of the
two-hour layover by touring the city. On the way, he sees the landscape and again has
reminisces of Spain. Salt Lake “Recuerda a Murcia, mancha de verdor en un valle mucho más

Fig. 2. “Cercado por montañas peladas y ardientes,” Andrew Willard Bishop.
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grande, inmenso” (“It recalls of Murcia, a spot of verdure in a valley much more grand,
immense”) (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 144). He also notices, similar to one shown in fig. 2, that
the valley is “Cercado por montañas peladas y ardientes” (“Enclosed by treeless and burning
mountains”) (144).
Salinas briefly mentions Salt Lake City in the letter to his wife, but for the railroad it is
one of major hubs of the Union Pacific Railroad. Salinas never mentions the name of the
railroad, but historical research verifies that the Union Pacific Railroad mainly services this part
of the US. The company also fathered a tour company to organize activities and facilities within
the national parks found in Utah. The smaller company called itself the Utah Parks Company.
The Utah Parks Company advertised across the country, and with the help of the Union Pacific
Railroad, sold tour packages to potential tourists. Salinas did not mention purchasing a tour
package from the Utah Parks Company, but the venues he wrote about implied he had done so.
One scholar summarized the transportation system in this manner:
For many years, tours from Chicago were sponsored by the Union Pacific in
conjunction with the Chicago & North Western, leaving every Saturday. They
included sightseeing stops at Ogden Canyon, Salt Lake City, and Denver, with
side trips to Colorado Springs and Pike’s Peak, taking two weeks. The tour routes
did not vary much over the years, but the details of the tours changed slightly.
(Waite 26)
Not only do the two companies carry passengers from one place to another, but they “were
directly involved in the development of these national parks and monuments” (17). In order to
do so they contract with individuals and the government to establish their facilities within those
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parks and develop them. 6 Salinas stays in some of the hotels and lodges operated by the Utah
Parks Company possibly since Manitou Springs, Colorado, but definitely when arriving in Utah.
The Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Line leaves Salt Lake City heading west, and upon
passing the Oquirrh Mountain Range and the Great Salt Lake, it turns southbound going through
the desert in western Utah.
Salinas does mention the Great Salt Lake and describes it beautifully writing, “Luego
hemos pasado junto al Lago Salado. ¡Rarísimo! A trechos como la costa de Alicante, rosa la
tierra, azul el agua” (“Later we have passed next to Salt Lake. Very strange! Like the coast of
Alicante in places, pink the land, blue the water”) (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 144). By so
describing the features of the landscape, Salinas leaves footprints for Margarita to follow using
“signs” she already has experienced in her life. Margarita implicitly gets the chance to behold
Salinas’s presence through his letters to her. When she reads the signs and significations
recorded on the page, she experiences the same things Salinas senses without having to be there
physically. By imagining the landscape as analogous to other landscapes she has been familiar
with, she instantly beholds the essence she already exerts in Salinas. The landscape she beholds

6

Other historians recount the founding of the Utah Parks Company this way:
The Utah Parks Company, a subsidiary of the Union Pacific Railroad Company was officially incorporated
in 1923. […] Through a series of agreements, leases and contracts, the Utah Parks Company became a
major factor in the development of the tourist industry at Zion, Bryce and Grand Canyon National Parks
and Cedar Breaks National Monument. The company developed and operated the transportation facilities
at these national parks. The transportation facilities included the operation of the railroad services between
the parks as well as the tour buses within each park. The Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Line, also
controlled by the Union Pacific Railroad, played a major part in the development of the transportation
facilities. (Kellough and Rowley 1)
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in her intentionality is not there in the same way the Utah landscape presents itself in reality, but
neither is it elsewhere. She participates with Salinas despite distances and time.
After passing the Great Salt Lake, the train takes Salinas down Tooele County into the
mountains and deserts of the Great Basin’s edge. The view does not disappoint him (see fig. 3).
“Y el viaje hasta aquí estupendo: tierras secas, desoladas, y montes y montes varios de forma,
rosados de color con su horizonte dilatadísimo y una luz radiante, sin un árbol” (“And the trip up
to here wonderful: dry lands, desolate, and mountains and mountains diverse in shapes, rosy in
color with their very vast horizon and a radiant light, without a tree”) (144). The desolate and
dry lands become filled intentions for the spiritual poet while trees surprisingly become empty

Fig. 3. “Juegos de sol y sombra en sus formas violentas,” Andrew Willard Bishop
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intentions. Unlike the short times he spends at parks, he has time to contemplate what he
beholds during train rides.
The scene carries on for hundreds of miles. He scans the land and sees “Cortinas y
cortinas de sierras y juegos de sol y sombra en sus formas violentas” (“Curtains and curtains of
mountain ranges and plays of sun and shadow in their violent forms”) (144). The shadows may
recall a poem from La voz a ti debida in which the poetic self exclaims:
Tú no puedes quererme:
estás alta, ¡qué arriba!
Y para consolarme
me envías sombras, copias,
retratos, simulacros,
todos tan parecidos
como si fueses tú.
You can’t possibly love me:
you are glorious, how you dazzle!
And to console me
you send me shadows, copies,
portraits, simulacra,
all so like you
they might as well be you. (1728-34; Crispin 83)
The shadows are but images of his beloved but are not the beloved herself. Salinas sees
Margarita and Katherine in these appearances, but these appearances are not Margarita and
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Katherine themselves. The features veil the presence of beloved in both cases. The poetic self
responds to the simulacra saying:
Yo vivo
de sombras, entre sombras
de carne tibia, bella,
con tus ojos, tu cuerpo,
tus besos, sí, con todo
lo tuyo menos tú.
I live
from shadows, among shadows
of warm, lovely flesh
with your eyes, your body,
your kisses, yes, with everything
of you except you. (Voz 1754-59; Crispin 83)
The beloved’s essence flees from the poetic self, and Salinas finds other essences standing in
place of the beloved. Like the shadows that mingle with the shine of the beloved’s light, he ebbs
and flows to and with her consciousness. Salinas recounts the images of the landscapes, their
shadows and radiance, to Margarita/Katherine as though she has already sent these filled
intentions to him. Salinas moves as though the appearances come to him, and not he to them.
The land offers Salinas solitude as he exercises his intentionality upon it. Outside the
metropolitan area of Salt Lake City, the population is very sparse. He finds spiritual
rejuvenation and writes, “Y ni una casa, ni un alma, en leguas y leguas” (“And not even a house,
not even a soul, for leagues and leagues”) (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 144). The railroad tracks act
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a connection bridging great chasms which are “enormes fosas llenas de su falta” (“enormous
cavities full of her absence”) (LL 1502). The distance he has from her only intensifies the bond
he has with her. Space is a unifying force and not a dividing one. One may ask, upon reading
the complete collection of letters, why Salinas would allow separating himself from her often.
His answer comes from a letter he writes to Margarita on July 6, 1941. He writes:
¿Qué es ese espacio tan grande que dices que se ha ido formando, por tu parte,
entre tú y yo, Margarita? No te entiendo bien. ¿Une o separa ese espacio que tú
sientes? ¿Es espacio de respirar, de moverse, de vivir, o espacio de distancia?
No te lo pregunto, claro. Me lo pregunto. Tú estás donde estás, donde quieres
estar. Yo sé dónde buscarte. “Porque tú tienes las señas –Donde tuviste las
alas.” 7 Hazte todo el espacio que quieras, que necesites. No me importa, porque
el espacio se traspasa y recorre en un segundo. […] Y la vida misma es espacio,
espacio ilimitado, en el que se puede uno volver con la vista a todas partes,
dejándola volar. Bendito tu espacio, si lo usas con tus alas. Alguna vez me

7

Pedro Salinas refers to a line from Rubén Darío’s “La lira de siete cuerdas” (“The Lyre of Seven Strings”). The

line comes from the “I cuerda” (“First String”):
Luz y gloria son tus galas,
ángel eres, y en Dios sueñas:
Tú debes tener las señas
donde tuviste las alas.
Light and glory are your finery,
angel you are, and in God you dream:
You must have the signs
where you received your wings. (Silva 158)
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encontrarás por él, porque yo ando rondando, con las alas que me haya dado
Dios, flojas o vigorosas, por ese espacio, también.
What is that space so big that you say that has been forming, on your part,
between you and me, Margarita? I don’t understand you well. Does that space
that you feel unite or separate? Is it space to breathe, to move, to live, or space of
distance? I am not asking you about it, of course. I ask myself. You are where
you are, where you want to be. I know where to look for you. “Because you have
the signs –Where you received your wings.” Make yourself all the space that you
want, that you need. It matters not to me, because space exceeds itself and travels
in a second. […] And life itself is space, unlimited space, where one can return
with the gaze towards all places, letting it fly. Happy your space, if you use it
with your wings. Sometimes you will meet me within it, because I go roaming,
with wings that God has given me, idle or vigorous, through that space, as well.
(Salinas, Cartas de viaje 158-59)
Margarita is the center for Salinas, not the other way around. He gives her space according to
her needs. Like the poetic self in Largo Lamento, he would rather “volverse sombra” (“to
become shadow”) than suffocate the one he loves (LL 1685-887). He reiterates this sentiment
again in a letter dated September 7, 1947, which reads, “Te digo otra vez, que esté donde esté,
haga lo que haga, y vea lo que vea, siento como un centro de gravedad espiritual, que eres tú, que
desde lejos gobierna mi bienestar o mi preocupación” (“I tell you again, wherever you are,
whatever you do, and whatever you see, I sense [something] like a center of spiritual gravity, that
is you, from afar that governs my wellbeing or my worry”) (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 209).
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Neither space nor distance bothers Salinas. He sees the center, the essence, the filled
intention of objects, in everything he sees. All his intentions, filled and empty, point to the same
entity. He penetrates the veil with his contemplation of his beloved. He finishes the letter and
writes: “Ayer, Marg, una embriaguez pura de nubes, hoy de montañas y tierra pura y desnuda.
[…] Estoy contento. Gozo honda y permanente, con los ojos y el alma. Lo demás es servidor de
ellos. Te abrazo en lo que siento” (“Yesterday, Marg, a pure intoxication of clouds, today of
mountains and pure and naked land. […] I am content. Profound and permanent joy, with the
eyes and the soul. The rest is at their service. I embrace you in what I sense”) (144).
Salinas sees these landscapes until the train stops at Lund, Utah, where he then catches a
local train that takes him to Cedar City, Utah. Roughly thirty miles later, the train pulls into a

Fig. 4. Cedar City Train Depot, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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depot (see fig. 4). Across the street to the south is El Escalante Hotel where tourists taking tours
provided by Utah Parks Company spend their nights. This is where Salinas hopes to find a letter
waiting for him, but upon finding out one is not waiting, he writes to Margarita instead. He
sleeps there one night and starts his tour of national parks the following day (see fig. 5).
Bryce Canyon National Park
“By 1931,” remarks Waite, “the Utah Parks Company was operating 65 buses out of
Cedar City over 459 miles of intrastate roads and 195 miles of interstate highways” (26). The
company sets up its headquarters in Cedar City because of its convenient location to nearby
parks and the station which the Union Pacific Railroad has built for that purpose. Waite also
informs that:

Fig. 5. El Escalante Hotel, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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While the railroad would build the new branch line and park facilities, the Utah
Parks Company would provide a loop tour of the parks in new motor coaches.
Although longer or shorter stays could be arranged, the tourist would be able to
visit Cedar Breaks, Kaibab National Forest, and the Grand Canyon, Bryce, and
Zion National Park in a loop tour which normally took five days. (23, see fig. 6)
Salinas decides only to take a loop tour of two days, because once he reaches Los Angeles on
August 10, 1940, three days have already passed, supposing he takes a day traveling to his final
destination (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 145).
According to Hi-Way Map to Zion-Bryce Canyon, Grand Canyon National Parks, by
1940, Highway 14 was an “improved road” consisting of gravel, stone, shell, or sand clay. 8
Salinas may have visited Cedar Breaks National Monument because it lays just a couple of miles

Fig. 6. UPC buses at station, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
8

Highway 20, an alternative route by way of northern Iron County and Panguitch, Utah, does not exist in 1940.
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off Highway 14, but he does not mention it in his letters. In any case, the tour bus drives up
Highway 14 until turning north on Highway 89 which is paved. The bus continues to Bryce
Junction to connect to Highway 12 and arrives at the Bryce Canyon National Park Lodge within
the park (see fig. 7). Inside the park, the tourists can again take advantage of a paved road all the
way to Rainbow Point. The map also mentions rates, and according to the room he describes in
his letter to his children, he may have reserved a Standard Sleeping Lodge Room, European plan
(without bath) at $2.25 per day.
This time, Salinas writes to his children, Solita and Jaime Salinas, on August 7, 1940. He
writes a descriptive account of his lodgings at the Bryce Canyon National Park Lodge and

Fig. 7. Bryce Canyon Lodge, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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includes a reference to a famous Spanish play:
Nobles vástagos: ¿Os acordáis, oh ignaros, de aquellos versos del “Tenorio”?:
“Yo a los palacios subí — yo a las cabañas bajé.” 9 Pues vuestro padre perilustre,
después de haber subido a hoteles-palacios esta noche va a dormir en una
cabaña de madera. Como Robinson Crusoe. Porque este Hotel es una
Federación de cabañas, en torno a un edificio central, donde no hay apenas
cuartos. Y a mí me ha tocado una cabaña muy cuca, con luz eléctrica y todo,
pero con la jofaina y el jarrito de nuestra España. (Márquese en los fastos de mi
historia como efemérides sin par que por primera vez voy a dormir en U.S.A. en
un cuarto sin agua corriente.) Por lo demás el Hotel es muy simpático. Figuraos
(¡y aprended!) que todos los que sirven a la mesa y cogen las maletas y están en
la oficina, son estudiantes de College u Universidad que, así, trabajando tres
meses, se ganan su matrícula. ¡Ánimo para la temporada de 1941, niño! El viaje
estupendo.
9

Pedro Salinas makes a reference here to the play Don Juan Tenorio by José Zorrilla. The complete verse reads:
Yo a las cabañas bajé,
yo a los palacios subí,
yo los claustros escalé
y en todas partes dejé
memoria amarga de mí.
I fell to the cabins,
I rose to the palaces
I burgled the cloisters
and in all places I left
bitter memories of me. (Zorrilla 206)
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Noble offspring: Do you remember, oh uneducated ones, those lines from
“Tenorio”?: “I rose to the palaces — I fell to the cabins.” Well your very
illustrious father, after having risen to hotel-palaces tonight is going to sleep in a
wooden cabin. Like Robinson Crusoe. Because this Hotel is a Federation of
cabins, around a central building, where there are hardly any rooms. And it
became my turn to get a very cute cabin, with electric lights and everything, but
with a washbasin and a pitcher from our Spain. (Let it be written in the archives
of my history like a matchless anniversary of events which took place on this day
that for the first time I am going to bed in the USA in a room without running
water.) For the rest the Hotel is very nice. Imagine (and learn!) how everybody,
those that serve tables and retrieve suitcases and work in the office, are College or

Fig. 8. Cabins, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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University students that, in this way, working three months, earn their tuition.
Courage for the 1941 season, son! A stupendous trip. (Salinas, Cartas de viaje
144-45)
Fig. 8 depicts cabins situated near the Grand Canyon and may model the ones located near Bryce
Canyon at the time.
He continues his letter to his children about observations he has made while making the
trip with other tourists. Again, he does not appreciate how tourists go from one venue to another
with cameras. He vents his frustration.
No ven, no miran, sino lo necesario para escoger el “tema” y fotografiarlo. De
donde deduzco el siguiente sabio apotegma: La actitud del turista hacia los
paisajes es la misma que la del cazador hacia la fauna: ver, apuntar, disparar y
seguir hasta la próxima presa. Supongo que luego, al volver a casa, verán en
foto, lo que no pudieron ver en realidad porque se les pasó el tiempo en hacer
fotos. ¡Técnica de turista!
They don’t see, they don’t look, except for the necessary to choose the “subject”
and photograph it. From whence I infer the following wise maxim: The attitude
of the tourist towards landscapes is the same as the hunter’s towards fauna: look,
aim, shoot and continue to the next prey. I suppose later, upon returning home,
they will see in the photo what they couldn’t see in reality because time swept by
them while taking pictures. Technology of tourists! (145)
He sees the tourists staying maddeningly in the first stage of his theory of tourism. They do not
take advantage of experiencing with their bodies the landscape around them. It is as though they
settle with photographic or pictorially filled intentions and representations rather than the real
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object itself. They may contain a record of having been to places, but they do not carry the
memories of them in their souls. Salinas continues, however, doing what he does best and
probes the essences of objects to pierce their veils of empty intentions.
Salinas writes to Margarita when he arrives at Los Angeles on August 10, 1940. This
time the recollections of his intentionality overwhelm him with what he has seen during the
previous two days. On August 8, he goes along with the tour group to take in the vistas at Bryce
Canyon. “He venido siguiendo un verdadero camino de maravillas,” (“I have come following a
true path of wonders”) writes Salinas (145). The two days he spends sightseeing “fueron
prodigiosos” (“were prodigious”) (145). He describes two national parks to Margarita,
overwhelmed with the visions he sees.
Bryce Canyon becomes a fascinating landscape with ambiguous appearances. He writes,
“El primero es un fantástico y enorme anfiteatro de piedras de color rosa, rojo, bermellón, gris y
blanco, que por la erosión del tiempo y las aguas, han tomado las más extrañas formas” (“The
first is a fantastic and enormous amphitheater of colored rocks of pink, red, vermilion, gray and
white, that by the erosion of time and the rains have taken the most peculiar shapes”) (145-46).
Merleau-Ponty asserted color necessitated touch in order for the subject to perceive the essence
of the object. Salinas perceives the colors of the sandstone transcendently, just like the poetic
self intends the seashell in “La concha” (“The Shell”) and the stone in “La memoria en las manos”
(“Memory in My Hands”). His contemplation allows him to imagine the time and the forces
shaping the features of the park.
Salinas then describes the features of the park saying, “Se sienta uno al borde de ese
abismo de maravillas y la vista se pierde entre formas de lo infinitamente posible” (“One feels on
the edge of that abyss of wonders and the view loses itself among forms of the infinitely
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possible”) (146). The infinity presented to Salinas offers him numberless sides, aspects, and
profiles to intend. The filled intentions purely present themselves to the poet. They also invoke
images of other objects emptily intended at this time. Salinas wonders writing, “¿Qué es aquello?
¿Un castillo, una catedral, un templo? Todo y nada. Pero para la interpretación de la
imaginación las variaciones, las posibilidades, no tienen fin” (“What is that? A castle, a
cathedral, a temple? Everything and nothing. But for the interpretation of the imagination the
variations, the possibilities, do not end”) (146). The confusion sweeps him back into a child-like
state of perception, similar to girl confusing clouds with smoke and the child naming everything
“Tatá, dada.” He perceives the world revolving and turning in his gaze even if his adult behavior

Fig. 9. “¿Un castillo, una catedral, un templo?” Andrew Willard Bishop
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manages to distinguish everything and nothing in the same entity. Fig. 9 shows how the canyon
hoodoos give ambiguous images to the observer.
The park also recalls to Salinas’s soul a painting he remembers. He comes closer to
perceiving through the body and expanding to the realm of the “I can” (Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and
Mind” 124). The hellish depiction he gives of the canyon manifests another identity laced within
Bryce’s sandstone. The comparison conjures up the divine and the demonic in one place, like
Dante’s sublime, poetic telling of a sobering locale.
A veces es un color de primitivo, de Fra Angélico, montes de rosa, de gris, de azul,
de blanco pálido. Todo lo que aquel pintor imaginaba está aquí. Otras veces, en
cambio los picachos parecen un mar de llamas, un infierno petrificado, y se
hunde la vista en oscuras galerías rojas y ardientes, pasillos del infierno. No he
visto nada de una hermosura tan extraña.
Sometimes it is a primitive color, of Fra Angelico, mountains of red, of gray, of
blue, of pallid white. All that the painter imagined is here. At other times, in
exchange the mountain peaks seem like a sea of flames, a petrified hell, and the
view sinks into obscure, red and burning galleries, corridors of hell. I have never
seen anything of such strange beauty. (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 146)
Salinas contemplates these scenes deeply, although in a very short time. He laments writing,
“Pasé muy pocas horas, por desgracia, allí, pero no las olvidaré” (“I spent very few hours,
unfortunately, over there, but I will never forget them”) (146). The places he visits exceed
expectations of previous trips, and he wishes implicitly to stay longer in order to probe the
ontology of these objects.

99

Zion National Park
Salinas and the group continue their travels by heading back the way they came the day
before. They return west on Highway 12 back to Bryce Junction and Highway 89. They head
south passing a small settlement named Mount Carmel until reaching another junction. They
turn and head west again on Mount Carmel Highway and reach Zion National Park. This park
also leaves an indelible impression on the poet. He says to Margarita, “Y luego Zion Park. Otro
prodigio: un desfiladero de proporciones inmensas, larguísimo, con paredes de piedra cortadas
casi a pico, y de colores” (“And later Zion Park. Another prodigy: a gorge of immense
proportions, very long, with sides of cut stone almost to a peak, and of colors”) (146). What

Fig. 10. Zion National Park, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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Zion lacks in texture it makes up for in size. Erosion wears away the park not bit by bit, but
chunk by chunk (see fig. 10).
Salinas views the previous park from above, standing on a plateau looking down. In Zion
however, he views the park from below, flanked by all sides in a narrow river valley. His
perception changes significantly as he sees from a different angle. Instead of intending evidence
of appearances from a secure standing, he senses a vertigo surrounding him in chaotic space.
“Se va por el fondo de la garganta, sobrecogido, atemorizado, y embriagado, al mismo tiempo,
de tanta grandeza y hermosura” (“One goes to the bottom of the throat, taken by surprise,
frightened, and drunken, at the same time, of so much greatness and beauty”) (146). The pure
essence collides with Salinas’s soul, jarring his intentionality.
Before reaching Zion Canyon National Park, Salinas’s anticipatory, empty intention does
not expect such grandness at this magnitude. He has seen the Grand Canyon in its splendor, but
the proximity and the intimacy of Zion intrigue him more strongly. “Porque también aquí las
rocas son colores: hay montes blancos, otros rojos, otros rosas” (“Because here as well the rocks
are colors: there are white mountains, others red, others pink”) (146). Again, texture plays a part
in helping Salinas perceive the colors (the whiteness, the redness, the pinkness) because the
objects are the colors instead of comprising of colors. The essences of the rocks’ colors shed a
magnificence of grandeur.
Salinas again sees the divine and the demonic. “Es una mezcla de solemnidad y poesía,
como ciertos poemas religiosos, Milton” (“It is a mix of solemnity and poetry, like certain
religious poems, Milton”) (146). Milton, of course, writes Paradise Lost, an epic poem about the
creation of Adam and Eve and their fall from grace by succumbing to the temptations of the
fallen angel Satan. The poem blends the sublimity of poetry with the terrible landscapes of the
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abyss. The spiritual connection he feels with these parks merit the attention Salinas gives them
and the mention of them to his central force, Margarita: “Estoy, Marg, como mareado,
embriagado de tanta belleza natural. La he gozado con toda mi alma. Ya te contaré, todo,
hablado, muy despacio. ¡Lástima, tener que meterse ahora en este Congreso ridículo!” (“I am,
Marg, as dizzy, intoxicated from so much natural beauty. I have enjoyed it with all my soul.
Later I will tell you, everything, very slowly. A shame, having to get involved now in this
ridiculous Conference!”) (146). Fig. 11, in essence and in reenactment, portrays the connection
the poet has with his beloved upon contemplating these parks. It also shows the Mount Carmel
Highway that Salinas took with his tour group to reach Zion National Park.
Salinas finishes his tour of national parks in Utah when the Utah Parks Company takes
him and the tour group back to Cedar City. Salinas catches the train at the station, rides to Lund,
and catches another train heading for the “ciudad-luz, luz-ciudad” (“city-light, light-city”) on the

Fig. 11. Mt. Carmel Highway, Special Collections, Sherratt Library, Southern Utah University.
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Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Line (145). Upon arriving at his accommodations, he finds
a letter from Margarita waiting for him. It is an empty intention imagined since Manitou Springs,
Colorado, which manifests itself as finally a filled one in Los Angeles, California. He
communes with his beloved through linguistic signs and significations. He promptly writes a
letter and ends it recording the following: “Tu carta me esperaba aquí. Gracias, alma, gracias.
Son el otro lado el de dentro, de las bellezas que he estado viendo. Por eso me siento hoy
contento y feliz, Marg, y te lo digo para tu alma” (“Your letter was waiting for me here. Thank
you, my love, thank you. They are the other side of the inside, of the beauties that I have been
seeing. That’s why I feel today, content and happy, Marg, and I tell it to you for your soul”)
(146, emphasis in original). Margarita Bonmatí and Katherine Whitmore have always formed
the center for Salinas. They are his beloved, his essence, and his communion. She represents
and is represented by all evidence within his perception. He lives for her. Salinas explains it
best in the following poem he writes for Katherine:
Qué alegría, vivir
sintiéndose vivido.
Rendirse
a la gran certidumbre, oscuramente,
de que otro ser, fuera de mí, muy lejos,
me está viviendo.
[……………………………………………………]
La vida —¡qué transporte ya!—, ignorancia
de lo que son mis actos, que ella hace,
en que ella vive, doble, suya y mía.
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[……………………………………………………]
Con la extraña delicia de acordarse
de haber tocado lo que no toqué
sino con esas manos que no alcanzo
a coger con las mías, tan distantes.
What a joy, to live
feeling yourself lived.
To surrender
to the great certainty, darkly,
that another being, outside of me, very far away,
is living me.
[…………………………………………]
Life—what ecstasy! ignorance
of what my acts are, which she performs,
in which she lives, double, her life and mine.
[…………………………………………]
With the strange delight of remembering
having touched what I never touched
except with those hands that I cannot reach
and take into mine, so distant are they. (Voz 792-97, 813-15, 821-24; Crispin 39)
Pedro Salinas lives through Margarita Bonmatí and Katherine Whitmore, and they live
through Pedro Salinas. Despite distances, they are together. Despite distances, Salinas sees his
poetic center’s essence or presence within landscapes. Landscapes are connections and portray a
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message using a language Salinas cannot decipher entirely. Through these essences he reaches
his beloved. In his letter of July 6, 1941, he compares the temporary distances he has with
Margarita to the space in which a bird flies:
Espacio, tiene para mí sensación de amplitud, de claridad, de aire circulante. Lo
cual quiere decir que un espacio, para mí, sólo separa si no se tiene voluntad y
afán de surcarlo, de recorrerlo. Hoy estaba yo pensando en las palabras de tu
carta, en la terraza, mirando vagamente al aire. Espacio. En el espacio lo
árboles las ramas. Y de cuando en cuando, de un árbol a otro, como una flecha,
cruzaba un pájaro. No, el aire no separa, me decía yo, por lo menos a los
pájaros. Lo terrible para los pájaros sería que no hubiese espacio. La jaula es la
limitación brutal de espacio.
Space, it has for me a sensation of amplitude, of clarity, of circulating air. The
idea means that a space, for me, only separates if we don’t have will and zeal to
ply it, to travel it. Today I was thinking the about the words of your letter, on the
balcony, looking vaguely in the air. Space. In space the trees the branches. And
from time to time, from a tree to another, like an arrow, a bird was crossing. No,
air doesn’t separate, I was telling myself, at least for the birds. The terrible thing
for birds would be that there was no space. The cage is the brutal imitation of
space. (Salinas, Cartas de viaje 159)
Freedom and will allow Salinas to connect with his beloved through space like a bird needs air to
take flight. Essences are what Salinas needs to connect with and understand the center of his
world. His body and his soul are one. They perceive the physical visible and the transcendental
invisible in the world and transform them into letters and poetry.
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Conclusion
Phenomenology studies the behavior of those who behold presentations in any form.
Although somewhat new in the timeline of philosophy, phenomenology has had philosophers
discuss the forms of absence and presence in objects since the beginning of recorded history.
Edmund Husserl starts the official field of research and others tally their ideas to phenomenology.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty specifically develops ideas of bodily experience, the visible and the
invisible, and the interconnection of the subject with the object. He shows how an artist changes
the essence of being of a landscape or of a figure into spectacle. Poets, like artists, create with
their bodies and perceive the world with their senses and with their souls.
This essay has explained some terminology relating to phenomenology. Intentionality, in
its various forms, connects the subject with objects outside his being. Filled and empty
intentions indicate how a person sees objects and in what context those objects emerge.
Perception assumes the subject’s ability to understand that he or she cannot empirically judge the
object’s essence when the same person comes from, is made of, and interacts with the universe.
Eidetic intuition implies the essence of the subject can be known completely by the subject as
long as the object retains its essential characteristic and does not fall apart. Presences and
absences show how people transport themselves to places where they intend memories, other
people, and experiences in a world that exists.
Pedro Salinas forms part of the Generation of 1927 and produces collections of poetry
about the intentionality of the beloved during a love affair. The collections include La voz a ti
debida, Razón de Amor, and Largo Lamento and they become a trilogy under the suggestion of
his friend Jorge Guillén. When put together, the story completes the poetic self’s circle of
experience. “La memoria en las manos” exerts a phenomenological force while the subject
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intends the stone and his hands while remembering an experience with the beloved who now no
longer remains. The stone acts as a means to connect with the beloved. The poetic self focuses
on the attributes of the stone and sees his beloved. As he perceives the stone, the hands facilitate
the invocation of the stone’s essence and the beloved’s presence. The hands express the poetic
self’s will and extension of his perception to the corners of his world. They remember the
beloved and allow the poetic self to commune with her. The intellectual focus raises issues of
recalling the essences of the participants through natural objects and sensory organs. The poetic
self probes the many layers of identities within a manifold of presentations in order to
comprehend the essence of the beloved. He sees all essences return to the beloved and he creates
a world in which he continually senses the presence of the beloved continually as the center of
this world.
Pedro Salinas records the same phenomenological experiences of essences in real life
when he travels. Through his correspondence with wife Margarita Bonmatí, we see how despite
distances and space, he intends his beloved constantly. He issues a theory of tourism relating to
phenomenological concepts and practices them consistently while intending landscapes across
the United States and other countries. In 1940, expectations exceed Salinas’s hopes when he
travels through Colorado and Utah, contemplating new landscapes of colorful sandstone and
other features in Bryce Canyon National Park and Zion National Park. Everything he meditates
on reveals the centrality Margarita and Katherine play in Salinas’s life and work. All objects,
presences, absences, essences, and experiences direct Salinas to his beloved. They exist as one.
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